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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In many developing countries, internal and external migration has become an important option 
for people facing poverty, unemployment and lack of opportunities. For the families left behind, 
remittances sent back represents an important flow of financial resources that help them to deal 
with harsh economic conditions, lack of access to capital markets and negative shocks in their 
lives. The estimations of the World Bank show that for the year 2010 around 3.2% of the world 
population have taken the decision of  living outside of their country of birth (about 215.9 
million people), and the inward remittances to developing countries were around 325.5 billion 
US$1.  
Migration and remittances have called the attention of numerous authors dating back to several 
decades ago.  The initial literature about the effect of migration and remittances on development, 
however, had a somewhat pessimistic view, as it was concerned with the reduction of the labor 
supply in countries with migratory outflows, a predominant non-productive use of the 
remittances, the development of remittance dependency, and the "brain drain" from developing 
countries. Nevertheless, more recent literature has a more optimistic view, as it has been argued 
the possibility of a "brain gain", and remittances are now considered to possible have positive 
short-run and long-run effects, as they might contribute to poverty reduction and facilitate 
household investments in human and physical capital2. 
This more recent literature recognizes that the effect of remittances depends on the specific 
conditions of the country or region under analysis. Thus, specific country case analysis is 
necessary to discern the effect of remittances on the welfare of the population.  It is precisely in 
that direction this research seeks to contribute, with the assessment of the migration and 
remittances effects on the welfare of the population of a developing country, Tajikistan. 
This former Soviet republic in Central Asia offers an excellent opportunity for such research 
since its economy is highly dependent on remittances, and the country has experienced important 
advances in poverty reduction and schooling coverage.  Officially recorded remittances had 
soared from 17.9 Million USD in 2002 to 1,748 Million USD in 2009. In terms of the GDP, 
remittances represented 9.4% of the GDP in 2002, but seven years later, in 2009, they were up to 
35%,   the highest proportion in the world in that year3. On the side of household’s welfare, 
                                                     
1 The World Bank, (2011) 
2 See De Hass (2005) for a review of the migration and remittances “myths and facts” 
3 The World Bank, (2011) 
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poverty levels experienced a sharp decline from 96% in 1999 to 47.2% in 2007, and secondary 
school enrollment have increased, from 74% in 1999 to 84% in 20094 
Such figures raise the question if the increase of remittances is indeed associated with the poverty 
reduction, the schooling increase, and in general with welfare improvements in Tajikistan. 
Shading some light on that question is precisely the overall objective of this research. Since 
remittances might affect multiple dimensions of welfare, the research needs to focus on some key 
aspects.  Among all the possible dimensions, three are selected: poverty levels, income inequality, 
and education. Poverty is chosen since remittances, which constitute an income transfer to the 
household, is expected to exert a more or less direct impact on income and consumption levels. 
Nevertheless, since remittances are not necessarily received by low-income households, they 
might, in fact, increase inequality in the country. Thus, their effect on income inequality needs to 
be examined. Finally, remittances, by allowing young household members to attend school and 
possibly reaching higher levels of education, might affect their quality of life as well as their ability 
to take advantage of future income opportunities (and hence having enduring effect on the 
development process of the economy).  
More formally, the question this paper tries to answer is: What has been the impact on poverty, 
inequality and human capital accumulation of migrant workers remittances in Tajikistan? 
Certainly, previous research has explored the effect of remittances on poverty and schooling in 
the country. Nonetheless, some methodological limitations prevented such research to yield a 
consistent evaluation of the effect of remittances. For instance, poverty levels without 
remittances have been estimated without considering an alternative source of income for the 
households. This procedure is likely to overestimate the effect of remittances on poverty since 
households probably would have looked for an alternative source of income if they had not 
resorted to migration and remittances.  This paper seeks to contribute to the assessment of the 
effect of remittances on poverty in Tajikistan by addressing this issue. Generally speaking it will 
use available personal and labor information of migrants to construct a hypothetical consumption 
aggregate in the case the migrants stop remitting and reincorporate to their households, 
simulating in this form how much the household consumption would have been without 
remittances.  
The paper also tries to contribute to the evaluation of the effect of remittances on school 
enrollment by overcoming some limitations in the previous literature. The problems, in this case, 
are more subtle as they are related to the specification of econometric models. However, possible 
                                                     
4 The World Bank ( 2012) 
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inconsistencies are promptly recognized. For instance, despite girls in Tajikistan have an 
enrollment rate around 40% lower than boys in secondary school, a previous study found that 
girls with similar individual characteristics, and living in similar households than boys, have 
actually higher probabilities to be enrolled at school5. Although possible, such result immediately 
calls for a revision of the estimation.  
A new contribution made by this paper is the evaluation of the effect of remittances on inequality 
on Tajikistan. During the revision of previous literature, no specific paper dealing with the topic 
was found. This is a rather interesting gap since as, it will be argued in the following sections, the 
effect of remittances on poverty and schooling depends on the distribution of income (or 
consumption). 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section two gives a general context of Tajikistan, 
including its recent migratory patterns, as well as recent developments in poverty, inequality and 
schooling. Section three makes a review of the previous empirical literature on the relationship 
between remittances, poverty, inequality and schooling. Section four presents a summary of the 
theoretical framework for the analysis of the effect of remittances on poverty, inequality, and 
human capital investments. Section five discusses the data and methodology used in this paper. 
Section seven describes some of the major characteristics of poverty, inequality and schooling in 
Tajikistan. Section eight presents and discusses the results of the estimation process. It starts with 
poverty, continues with inequality and finishes with schooling. Section eight concludes.   
 
  
                                                     
5 See Nakamuro, (2010) 
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2. COUNTRY CONTEXT 
 
The Republic of Tajikistan has the lowest income per capita among the former Soviet Republics 
and the highest proportion of people living with less than two dollars a day among the Central 
Asian Republics.  Its income per capita, however, has experienced sustained increases after the 
end of the civil war in 1997, and poverty was reduced from a headcount ratio of 96% in 1999 to 
47.2% in 2009. 
Chart 1 – GDP and Remittances in Tajikistan 
 
Data source: World Development Indicators (2015) 
Administratively, the country is divided into 5 different regions:  two provinces, Sughd and 
Khatlon; the autonomous province of Gorno-Badakhshan (GBO); the Region of Republican 
Subordination (RRS), and the capital city of Dushanbe. 
Accordingly to the national population census of 2010, the population of the country was 
7,564,502 people. The Khatlon region has the larger population with 2, 150,136 people, followed 
by the Suhgd region. Dushanbe, the capital city, is also the biggest city in population terms, with 
747,500 inhabitants.  
2.1 Migration and Remittances in Tajikistan 
Accordingly to Olimova & Bosc (2003) in a report prepared for the International Organization 
for Migration, Tajikistan, as other ex-Soviet Republics, started to experience important labor 
emigration after the collapse of the Soviet Union. During the soviet period, emigration consisted 
mainly of youth migrants pursuing vocational training or higher education in Russia or Ukraine. 
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During the 1970 and 1980, apart from this student outflow, other Tajiks migrated to participate 
in construction projects in the URSS, as well as to settle in remote areas of Russia, and to develop 
gas and oil field in Siberia.  
After the break-up of the Soviet Union, Tajikistan experienced a civil war that lasted from 1991 
to 1997. The conflict had terrible human consequences and severely affected economic activity. It 
is estimated that over 50,000 people were killed, and around 1.2 million people become refugees 
or internally displaced persons6. The income per capita contracted to less than one-third of its 
level in the year previous to the beginning of the war.  
To the initial population movement caused by the civil war, further migrations have followed in 
the post-conflict years. The devastation of the war, and the deterioration of previous important 
economic activities during the transition to a market economy, caused a harsh economic 
situation, with high levels of unemployment, low salaries that were usually delayed and 
widespread poverty.  
Olimova & Bosc (2003), after conducting several interviews with migrants and their families, 
conclude:  
“Thus the main reasons why Tajiks enter labour markets elsewhere in the CIS7, particularly in Russia, are 
the negative conditions they face at home: high levels of unemployment and poverty, especially among youth 
(30%); the collapse of former sources of employment caused by structural changes; low salaries and disruptions 
of payment; and social stratification (growing gap between rich and poor)” 
The population structure and high birth rates add to the migration incentives. The average age 
was 22.8 years old in 2001, and the working-age population (15 to 64 years old) made up to 
54.2% of the inhabitants. The majority of the Tajik people lives in rural areas (73.5%), but the 
mountainous geography of the country makes the most of them live in only 7% of the territory. 
Relatively young population, living mainly in rural areas in a relatively small portion of the 
country increases competition for jobs, even though the population growth has diminished in the 
previous decade (from 3% between 1981 and 1990, to 1.85% between 1991 and 2000, and 2% in 
2001)8 
                                                     
6 United Nations (s.f.) 
7 CIS stands for “Commonwealth of Independent States”  
8 Olimova & Bosc (2003) 
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It is estimated that more than 80% of Tajik labor migrants choose the Russian federation as their 
destiny9. There are several factors explaining this pattern. Suitable job opportunities with a higher 
salary than in Tajikistan, in an expanding Russian economy, are the main reason.  A visa-free 
regime and the ability to speak Russian are also factors that facilitate the migration process. Also, 
migrant networks have been established in Russia, in part due to the displacement during the civil 
war and in part due to previous migration during the soviet period10.   
Most of the migrants send remittances back home. The aggregate estimated figures for officially 
recorded remittances are presented Chart 2. Probably, the low levels registered in the former 
years are partially due to the widespread use of informal channels to remit.  What is more, prior 
to 2000, the government charged remittances with a 30% of its nominal value, and even after the 
suppression of such tax and the ease of the banking transfer produces,  many still did not trust 
the banking system as Olimova & Bosc (2003) pointed out. In any case, by 2008 remittances were 
equivalent to a 49% the country’s GDP. And, although in 2009 the country received a lower 
amount of remittances, mainly due to the effects of the global economic crisis in Russia, they 
represented 35% of the GDP, the highest percentage in the world in that year.  
Chart 2 - Personal Remittances received in Tajikistan   
 
Source: Data from World Development Indicators, 2015 
 
                                                     
9 The World Bank (2005) 
10 Olimova & Bosc (2003) 
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2.2 Poverty and Inequality 
The data from the World Bank shows an acute poverty reduction since 1999. In that year, the 
vast majority of the population, up to 96%, lived under the poverty line.  Since then, the 
proportion of the population living under the poverty has been reduced to 72% in 2003, 53.1% 
in 2007 and 47.2% in 2009.  
Accordingly to the World Bank poverty assessment of 2009, which is based on the Living 
Standard Survey of 2007, the data suggest a strong correlation between increasing remittances 
and migration and the observed poverty reduction. Indeed, as can be observed in Chart 2, the 
volume of remittances in current US$ rose from 146 million in 2002 to 1,690.7 million in 2007. 
Accordingly to their analysis, remittances account as much as 35% of the household 
consumption (and even more for the households at the lower end of the consumption 
distribution).  Similarly to other literature, the World Bank conducted simulations in which the 
amount of remittances declines. Depending on the assumptions made (how many migrants 
return to the home country and whether or not they are able to find a job), the poverty could 
increase to 54.8% in the most optimistic scenario, or 59.6% in the worst case. Nevertheless, as 
with other literature, these simulations do not take into account possible self-selection of the 
households into migration and remittances11. 
Chart 3 - Poverty in Tajikistan 
 
Source: Data from World Development Indicators, The World Bank 
                                                     
11 For a discussion of the estimations problems raised by households self-selection into migration and remittances 
see section 7.2.1 
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Social protection programs are not well developed in Tajikistan. The social assistance spending 
accounts only for 5% of the GDP accordingly to the World Bank and it is concentrated in 
providing old-age pensions, received to one-third of the households. Another social assistance, 
such as gas or electricity subsidies is received for only 1% of the households.  
Inequality, as measured by the Gini Index, however, does not show a clear trend as the 
headcount ratio. Between 1999 and 2003, when poverty experienced a pronounced decline, 
inequality was on the rise, with the Gini index growing from 29.52 to 32.72. On 2007, inequality 
showed a small decrease, with the Gini index at 32.19. A further decrease was registered at 2009. 
Nevertheless, the inequality levels were still higher than in 1999.  
The behavior of the Gini index raises the question if remittances, although probably helping in 
the reduction of poverty, are also provoking an increase in inequality. This could be the case if 
remittances are not equally distributed among the population. Even when some poor households 
receive remittances than allow them escaping poverty, if the majority of the remittances are 
captured by the middle or high-income households, inequality will increase.   
Chart 4 - Inequality in Tajikistan 
  
Source: Data from World Development Indicators, The World Bank 
2.3 Schooling 
The educational system of Tajikistan consists of four different levels, as can be seen in Table 1. 
Preschool education; general education, which is subdivided in general primary, general basic (or 
middle school), and general secondary (or high school); Professional education might follow the 
completion of general basic education, in the primary and secondary levels. Access to higher 
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education might be granted after the completion of secondary education (either general or 
professional). 
Table 1 - Levels of education in Tajikistan 
Levels of Education Duration of 
studies 
Age Educational Institutions 
Pre-school training and 
education 
1-3, 3-6 1-6(7) Kindergarten/nursery 
General education 
 Primary 
 General basic 
 General secondary 
11 years 
4 years 
5 years 
2 years 
7-18 
7-11 
11-16 
16-18 
General education schools, 
gymnasiums, lyceums 
Professional education 
 Primary 
 Secondary 
 higher 
 
1-4 years 
2-4 years 
4-6 years 
 
From age 16 
From age 16 
* 
Vocational schools, centers, 
technical colleges, colleges, special 
secondary schools, Universities, 
academies, institutes 
Post-diploma education   Master courses, post-graduate 
courses, doctorate courses 
Additional (extra education)   ** 
* is conducted on the basis of general secondary, primary and secondary professional education 
** is conducted in regular schools of general and professional education, outside main educational curricula or in the 
establishments for additional education (small research academies, palaces, stations, clubs, centers, art and musical 
schools, etc). 
Source: Ministry of Education of the Republic of Tajikistan (2005) 
Access to education has increased in the past years. The primary education net enrollment has 
gone from around 94.5% in the year 2000 to 97.3 in the year of 2011. Basic education (or lower 
secondary) has also maintained relatively high net enrollment ratios with some growth over the 
years. Upper secondary, however, still report relatively low enrollment ratios, despite the growth 
from 42.8% in 2004 to 54.4% in 2011. 
Chart 5 - Net Enrollment rates in Tajikistan 
 
Source: Data from UNESCO (2015)  
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3. RELATED LITERATURE 
 
The following section includes a review of some of the relevant literature dealing with the 
assessment of the effect of remittances on poverty, inequality and schooling. The objective of the 
section is not only to offer a summary of the present literature and their results, but also discuss 
some of the main methodological problems faced by the authors.  
3.1 Poverty and Inequality 
There are several studies assessing the role of migrant remittances in poverty reduction. Some of 
these studies explore the subject in a cross-country perspective. For example, Adams Jr. & Page 
(2005) using a dataset for 71 developing countries find that a 10% increase in the per capita 
remittances received by a country will decrease its percentage of people living in poverty by an 
average of 3.5%.  Most of the literature, however, focuses on case studies of countries with a high 
percentage of migrant workers and which economies are highly dependent on their remittances. 
Among this literature, it is possible to find papers about Guatemala, Mexico, El Salvador, 
Bangladesh, Nigeria, Ethiopia, among others.  
Since Tajikistan is one of those countries whose economy is highly dependent on migrant 
remittances, it is not strange to find at least one paper evaluating the effect of remittances on 
poverty. Betti & Lundgren (2012) do these by using data from the “Migration, Remittances and 
Poverty Survey” 12 collected by the Tajik State Statistical Office in 2009. As their main finding, 
they argue that without remittances poverty incidence will rise from 55% of the population to 
82% or 85%, depending upon the assumed scenario.   
To reach the previous conclusion, Betti & Lundgren (2012) apparently assumed that the income 
coming from the remittances is exogenous (i.e. independent of the characteristics of the 
households). Then, in the first scenario they simply reduce remittances from the household 
income and re-estimate the headcount ratio. In the second scenario, migrants are assumed to 
return to the household. This adds one or more members to each remittance-receiving 
household, which in most of the cases is a poor household or became poor due to the lack of 
remittances. Apparently no alternative income source is assumed. Once again, the headcount 
ratio is re-estimated. 
                                                     
12 This was a sampling-adaptative survey (based on the Tajik Integrated Household Budget Survey) aimed to secure 
information of houses with migrants. However it has the disadvantage (recognized by the authors) that it is not 
necessary representative of the whole country, due to the fact that areas with frequent migration are over-represented 
See pag.  396 in Betti & Lundgren (2012). 
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However, the previous results are not likely to provide an unbiased estimate of the effect of 
migrant remittances on income and poverty levels. First, the construction of the contrafactual 
scenario (what would have been the income of the income remittances-receiving household in 
the case no family member had migrated and remitted?) does not consider possible income 
generated by the returned members. Second, as explained by Beyene (2014), income from 
remittances is not likely to be exogenous. The characteristics of the individuals and households 
are likely to affect the decision to migrate and the status of the household as a remittance 
recipient. This implies that not all individuals have the same probability to migrate and remit, and 
not all the household have the same probability to receive remittances. For instance, more 
educated individuals might be more willing to migrate, but also receive a higher salary if they stay 
in the home country. Hence, just adding or subtracting remittance to the household income and 
then re-estimating the poverty levels will not give a reliable result for the impact of remittances 
on poverty.    
In order to deal with this issue of household and individual self-selection into migration and 
remittances Beyene (2014) uses a two-stage Heckman selection method in his paper on the 
effects of remittances on poverty and inequality in Ethiopia. The first stage consists in a probit 
model for the probability of a household of no receiving remittances. The second stage uses 
information from the first stage to estimate a consumption equation for the remittance recipient 
households only. This equation is then used to compute the consumption in the no-remittances 
contrafactual scenario13. 
Beyene (2014) results, which are based on data from an household survey collected in the capital 
city of Ethiopia, Addis Ababa during 2004, show a poverty reduction effect of remittances of 
three percentage points in the headcount ratio (from an observed 38% to a contrafactual scenario 
of 41%). The author also estimated the effects on inequality. In order to do this, he calculated 
Gini indexes using consumption per capita for the observed and contrafactual scenario.  
Nevertheless, no reduction or increase in the Gini index was found.  
Limitations of the data regarding migrants’ characteristics forced Beyene to make the assumption 
that returnee migrants have no employment and count with secondary education. These 
assumptions, however, are likely to underestimate the consumption levels of those households 
with hypothetical returnee migrants, and hence overestimate the effect of remittances on poverty.   
                                                     
13
 Beyene ( 2014, p. 1383) 
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As with the impact of remittances on poverty, the impact on inequality might differ from country 
to country. Differently to Beyene, Acevedo & Cabrera (2014) argue that the decreasing inequality 
in El Salvador between the years of 1994 and 2009, it is mainly due to the remittances that 
increased the income of the bottom half and migration of highly skilled individuals that reduced 
the skill premium. 
However, no specific study relating migrant remittances and income inequality was found for 
Tajikistan. 
3.2 Human Capital 
Previous literature on the effect of remittances and migration on households' human capital 
investment have reached different conclusions: some have found a positive effect on school 
enrollment and attainment, whereas others have found a negative or null effect. The studies differ 
in their methodology, making difficult to directly compare or generalize their results. 
An influential paper that finds a positive effect of remittances on school attendance is that of 
Cox-Edwards & Ureta (2003) for El Salvador. The authors used household survey data for 1997 
and the Cox proportional hazard model to estimate the effect of different household 
characteristics over the hazard of dropping school, including income from remittances. The main 
results show that if a household receives the median remittance, the hazard that a child drops the 
school is lowered between 24% and 54% 
Nevertheless, not considering the possible endogeneity of the remittances is an important 
limitation in the paper.   For instance, if households receiving remittances systematically differ in 
unobservable characteristics that are positively correlated with remittances and school attendance, 
the estimated effect of the remittances over school attendance would be biased upwards.  In 
order to deal with this problem, Acosta (2006) uses instrumental variables along with a Probit 
model as the estimation method. He reaches different results for El Salvador in 1998:  children 
aged 11 to 14 years old in household receiving remittance are more likely to be enrolled in school 
than their peers from non-receiving household; however, there is no significant effect for 
children ages 15 to 17.  
McKenzie & Rapoport (2006) argue that, since school attendance does not take into account 
possible grade repetition, delays in starting schooling, or catch-ups, a preferable dependent 
variable would be school attainment (as in completed years of education). Using a "Instrumental 
Variable - Censored Ordered Probit" model these authors find a negative, and in general 
statistically significant, effect of living in a migrant household over school attainment for children 
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aged 12 to 18 years in rural Mexico, although the specific effect depends on the educational level, 
age, and sex. Negative effects are also found in school attendance. 
There is one paper dealing with remittances, migration, and human capital investment in 
Tajikistan in 2003. Similarly to previous studies, Nakamuro (2010) uses instrumental variables 
along with a Probit model as main estimation technique. The results show a positive effect of 
remittances on the probability that individuals aged 7 to 22 years are enrolled in the school.  
However, the estimation method chosen by Nakamuro (2010) is rather inappropriate for the 
analysis of the effect of receiving remittances over school enrollment. In short, the estimation of 
an “IV probit” needs the assumption of a continuous endogenous regressor in order to yield 
consistent results. Obviously, when the endogenous regressor is a categorical variable taking the 
value of one when the household receives remittances and zero otherwise, this assumption is 
violated14. 
There is at least other problem with the estimations of Nakamuro. He incorporates the 
observable income of the household as a determinant of children’s school enrollment. This 
would not be a problem if the interest were other than establishing the effect of remittances on 
school enrollment.  Remittances are indeed a source of extra income for the household, which is 
incorporated in the observable income. But, if one is interested in how enrollment would be for a 
household that receives remittances in the hypothetical case of not receiving any remittances, the 
observable income is no longer an accurate measure of the earnings of the household. 
4. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Although the main objective of this paper is not to explain migratory or remitting decisions, 
some words are needed to clarify why these decisions are likely to be affected by the household 
characteristics, something that was implicit in many of the literature reviewed in the previous 
section. The “new economics of migration” argues that migration decisions, especially in 
developing countries, are taken by families or households rather than isolated individuals. In their 
decisions, households not only attempt to maximize the expected income, but also to reduce risk 
and constraints associated with market failures. In order to do so, the household is likely to 
diversify the allocation of its resources, including household labor supply. In that sense, 
                                                     
14 Angrist & Pischke (2009) call this type of regression “forbidden regressions”. See pages 188 to 215 on their book 
for more details.  
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individuals in the household might collectively decide to send a member to work in a country in 
where wages are not correlated with wages in the home country15.   
In principle, remittances constitute an income transfer to households, and as such, the logical 
effect is an increase in the income and consumption levels of the households. Nevertheless, when 
it comes to the effect on poverty and income distribution, the remittances impact is not that 
straightforward. Since migration, especially internationally, is a costly and risky process, it is not 
necessarily the poorest people who migrate the most. However, non-migrant poor households 
might be affected indirectly by the economic-wide effect of remittances, such as new 
employment opportunities16.  
Similarly, the effect of migration and remittances on income distribution depends on the 
selectivity of the migrants. If migrants come mostly from relatively high-income households, 
remittances are likely to increase income inequality. On the contrary, if migrants come mostly 
from relatively low-income households, remittances are likely to decrease income inequality. De 
Hass (2007), explain that the selectivity of the migrants (and hence the impact of remittances on 
poverty and income distribution) is closely related to the previous migratory history or experience 
in the communities. Migration in communities with little previous migratory experience is likely 
to be undertaken by individuals in relatively wealthy households due to the high cost and risk 
involved in the migration process. With further experience, migratory networks tend to appear, 
diminishing the cost and risk of the migration process, and hence making possible for individuals 
in less wealthy households to migrate.  
Other factors affecting the migration selectivity are the destination and type of work. 
International migration, compared with internal migration, implies a higher cost and thus tends to 
be undertaken by individuals in wealthier households. Low skilled or undocumented work in the 
host country is likely to attract a higher proportion of individuals coming from low-income 
households17.  
The long-run effects of remittances on development are recognized to depend to a large extent in 
whether remittances are spent on consumption or investment, either physical or human.   
At the individual level, the standard human capital theory gives a general framework to 
understand the possible effect of remittances on schooling. In general terms, Becker (1962) 
explains that individuals decide to invest in human capital if the present value of the future 
                                                     
15 Graeme, et al. (1993) 
16 De Hass  (2007) 
17 Idem 
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earnings is higher than the cost incurred. In this computation, the individual weights future 
earnings, discounted at the appropriate rate, against direct costs of schooling, such as tuition fees, 
books or transportation, and the forgone earnings, that is what he or she could have earned if he 
or she were not attending school.  
In taking his or her decision, the individual has stronger incentives to invest in human capital the 
lower the cost of the investment, the longer the period in which the individual can collect its 
benefits, the larger the returns to education (that is the larger the wage differential between 
people differencing only by their schooling), and the lower the risk associated with the returns. 
A point made by Becker is how difficult obtaining external funding for human capital 
investments could be for the individual. Even when the rate of return is expected to be positive, 
it is still uncertain. Possible borrowers are then reluctant to lend financial resources because the 
very “illiquid” nature of human capital (it cannot be sold as it is embodied in the person), and 
thus makes a poor collateral. This makes internal funding to be more common, and hence 
wealthier households are likely to invest more in human capital than poor households. 
The “new economics of migration” adds that the household lack of access to capital markets in 
developing countries is also a reason for the households to send some of their members abroad. 
With the remittances send back, the household acquire the necessary capital to invest in human 
or physical capital. 
Following a similar way of reasoning, Rapoport & Docquier (2006) present a simple model 
relating the investment in human capital under liquidity constraints and remittances.  Individuals 
chose not to enroll in educational programs because the cost of the programs is beyond their 
financial capabilities, and they cannot use credit markets to cover the cost. Nevertheless, if 
migration to a high-wage country is possible, the resources remitted by the migrants might allow 
their descendants to access education, increasing their wages in the next period. Moreover, if a 
large portion of the population becomes educated, wage rates are likely to increase for the whole 
population. 
Additionally, McKenzie & Rapoport (2006) call the attention to the fact that migration might 
have implications for human capital investment other than the effect of remittances. First, the 
absence of one household member could translate into less support to children’s school activities, 
or even lead children to involve in labor activities, especially if the remittances received are low or 
irregular. Second, having a migrant parent might increase the probability that children become 
migrants themselves, due to networks and information lowering the cost of migration. Third, 
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depending on how education is economically rewarded in the migration destination, households 
could choose to invest more or less in children education. 
Chart 6 below summarizes the main conclusions of the theoretical framework. 
Chart 6 - Expected effect of remittances on inequality, poverty, and schooling   
 
 
5. METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
7.1 Data Source Review 
The data of households and individuals characteristics in Tajikistan used in this paper comes 
from the Tajikistan Living Standards Measurement Survey (TLSMS) of 2007 conducted by the 
Tajik State Statistical Office with assistance from the World Bank. This survey includes topics of 
migration, education, labor market, financial services, expenditures, agricultural assets, among 
others that are thought to be useful to analyze the welfare of the household. The units of analysis 
in the survey include households and individuals. The sample is representative of the population 
at the national, regional and urban/rural level. It counts with 4,860 interviews for 2007.  
Despite the advantage of the wide spectrum of topics covered by the survey and the country 
representativeness, as practically every household surveys, the TLSMS 2007 has some limitations. 
Deaton (1997) explains how the necessity to really on recalled data for measuring consumption 
and income, rather than direct observations, induce some measurement error, especially for long 
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recall periods.  In households that produce some goods for self-consumption, the price 
imputation process induce some extra measurement errors for the consumption and income 
aggregates, a problem that becomes more pervasive in developing countries and rural areas where 
markets are not well developed. If the household is involved agriculture or a family business, the 
consumption and income for the family, and the costs and revenues from the business are likely 
to be confused, inducing even more problems for the estimation of the household consumption 
and income. 
No evaluation of the magnitude of the previous problems was found for the TLSMS. 
Nevertheless, as explained in the reference documentation of the TLSMS 2007, after two 
previous surveys in 1999 and 2003, several modifications were made to the questionnaire in order 
to improve the data collection. A migration module was added for the first time, which collects 
several characteristics of the absent migrants and previous migration history of the household, 
the labor market module was redesigned to better look at informal activities, and several food 
items were added to the food expenditure section. Thus, at least compared with surveys of 
previous years, the TLSMS 2007 information appears to be more suitable to the objective of this 
paper.  
However, a valuable piece of information about remittances is missed by the TLSMS 2007 
questionnaire.  Although the questionnaire asks for the previous migratory experience of present 
members of the households, it does not ask if they used to remit during their time abroad or if 
they have brought part of their wages back home. The survey only asks for remittances received 
from migrants currently abroad.  Since temporary migration is quite common in Tajikistan, 
estimation of the proportion of households receiving remittances using only data of migrants 
abroad at the time of the survey is most likely underestimated. Some of these unreported 
remittances in the migration module might have been collected in the section regarding other 
income, as it asks for “donations and gift” made by family members and friend during the past 12 
months, but money brought back is not counted in that or any other section. 
Fortunately, however, the time in which the survey was made (September to October in the first 
stage, and October to November for the second stage) does not coincide with the wintertime in 
the Northern hemisphere in which many temporary migrants return home. This is still no 
guarantee that every remittance or money brought back home is collected in the survey, but as 
the percentage of households with migrants and the percentage of households receiving 
remittances is very similar, it seems that at least the remittances of migrants currently abroad are 
mostly registered. 
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Since the poverty line used in this paper was estimated by the World Bank using the same data 
collected in TLSMS 200718, a word is deserved in here. The methodology used for the 
construction of the poverty line followed the cost of basic need approach. In short, this method 
requires finding a reference group for which consumption patterns can be drawn, set the required 
caloric intake per person, give a monetary value for the caloric requirements (this constitutes the 
value of the food poverty line), and set allowances for non-food consumption (to obtain the 
complete poverty line). 
Although the method is intuitive, the specific poverty line obtained for Tajikistan has some 
limitations. First, the caloric consumption has been set for an average person in an average 
household. Thus, it might not be appropriate to evaluate the situation of households with an 
unusual composition (for instance single adult households). Moreover, if economies of scale in 
the household size and composition are assumed, the poverty line should be adjusted. Second, 
the poverty line has no allowance for housing or durable goods expenditures, hence in classifying 
households above or below the poverty line, its consumption needs to exclude such components 
as well  
      
7.2 Estimation Method 
7.2.1 Poverty and Inequality 
When the welfare of individuals or households is the main concern, poverty and inequality are 
usually measured in terms of income or consumption. Both measures have their advantages and 
disadvantages. However, for developing countries consumption is commonly preferred, mostly 
due to practical reasons. As explained by Deaton (1997) consumption estimates are likely to be 
more accurate than income estimates in developing countries since the measurement problems of 
recall bias, price imputation or the separation between business and household activities, are less 
acute for consumption than for income. Haughton & Khandker, (2009) would argue in favor of 
consumption as a more appropriate measure of welfare than income since the former is less 
susceptible to pronounce seasonal variations or unexpected shocks. Following this reasons, this 
paper uses consumption to compute poverty and inequality measures. 
Using only observed consumption, however, does not allow for a proper evaluation of the effect 
of remittances on poverty and inequality, even if measures of poverty and inequality are 
computed separately for households receiving remittances and households that do not receive 
                                                     
18 The procedure followed for the construction of the poverty line is described in detail in The World Bank Group 
(2008) 
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remittances. The problem is that only the consumption with remittances is observable. But for 
evaluating the impact of the remittances, the consumption before or without remittances is 
needed.   
Since the data at hand do not contain information about the situation of the households before 
they started to receive remittances19, a hypothetical no-remittances consumption aggregate need 
to be constructed using the available information. Once this hypothetical or contrafactual 
consumption aggregate is estimated, poverty and inequality measures can be computed using the 
contrafactual aggregate for households receiving remittances and actual consumption for those 
households not receiving remittances. This constitutes the contrafactual, or no-remittances 
scenario, measures of poverty and inequality. Finally, the actual poverty and inequality measures 
can be compared with the contrafactual, and the difference can be attributed to the change in 
remittances. 
The real challenge to the process explained above is how to estimate the hypothetical no-
remittances consumption aggregate.  A practical solution is to predict the consumption of a 
household (or the per capita consumption of the household) as a function of its observable 
characteristics using regression methods. Intuitively, a regression using Ordinary Less Squares 
(OLS) will give how much the expected consumption aggregate of a household is, given its 
observable characteristics. Notice that since the no-remittances consumption is not observable 
for household receiving remittances, the regression will need to be estimated using information 
of non-receiving households.     
However, in order to give unbiased results, OLS requires, among other conditions, that the 
unobservable characteristics to be uncorrelated with the observable characteristics included in the 
regression and/or uncorrelated with the explained variable. It also requires that the estimation 
sample to be randomly selected (conditional on the included explanatory characteristics). 
Unfortunately, these two conditions are not likely to hold in the context of households receiving 
remittances. The main problem is the self-selection of the households into migration and 
remittances, which yield a non-random sample. Take for instance two households equal in every 
observable characteristic likely to affect consumption (household composition, employment and 
education to list a few), but when faced with the possibility of migration, just one of them choose 
to send a member abroad and receive remittances. Most likely, the household that decided to 
send a member abroad do so because it expects that its consumption will be higher if remittances 
                                                     
19 Some of the households visited in the TLSMS 2007 where revisited in 2009, however, the sample is drastically 
reduced from 4,860 households to 1,500 
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are received from a migrant, than if the migrant stay in the home country. Perhaps household’s 
members lack the right contacts in the home country or have better information about job 
opportunities abroad. If variables capturing these characteristics were available, they could be 
incorporated in the consumption regression to condition the sample.  Nevertheless, it is precisely 
this type of characteristics (motivation, contacts, information, etc.) that are almost never 
observable.  
Therefore, if the hypothetical consumption for the no-remittance case is predicted using OLS 
with the information available the results would not be consistent because those in the sample 
(the household that decided not to migrate) are systematically different to those who decided to 
migrate.   
 A standard solution for the self-selection problem is to use a Heckman Selection Model20. In 
short, for the case at hand, consumption per capita (in logarithms) is modeled as a function of 
the observable characteristics (X) of the non-receiving households: 
             (1) 
However, the no-remittance consumption is observable only for those who do not receive 
remittances. This, selection decision is modeled again as a function of some of the household 
characteristics.  
   (        ) (2) 
Notice that consumption and selection in no-remittances are modeled using observable 
characteristics of the households in the vectors X and Z. Unobservable characteristics that are 
likely to affect consumption or selection are in the error terms u. Most likely such unobservable 
characteristics (such as contacts or motivation) affect both, selection and consumption, making 
the correlation between the error terms (ρ) different from zero. 
    (   ) 
    (   ) (3) 
    (     )     
                                                     
20 Heckman (1979) 
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Assuming the error terms have a normal distribution with mean zero and variance equal to σ and 
1 for u1 and u2 respectively, the conditional expectation of the consumption for the households 
not receiving remittances can be written as: 
 [            ]         ( 
   )  (4) 
Where λ is what Heckman referred as the inverse Mill’s ratio 
   
 ( ̂   )
 ( ̂   )
  (5) 
Where ϕ and Φ are the normal density function and cumulative density function respectively. 
Intuitively, including λ shifts the conditional expectation of consumption of those households 
that decided not to send a migrant abroad and not receive remittances due to unobservable 
characteristics in the right direction. For instance, assuming that ρ is larger than zero, a household 
for which consumption is observed, but with a low γ' Zj (low probability of not receiving 
remittances) is likely to have chosen not to send any migrants due to unobservable characteristics, 
and also it is more likely to have a higher consumption in the sample due to unobservable 
characteristics. The parameter λ is capturing such effect.  
Finally, notice that is probable that the same observable characteristics that affect consumption 
also affect the selection into no-remittances. However, in order to estimate the model at least one 
variable needs to be incorporated into the selection equation but not in the consumption 
equation. Ideally, this variable needs to affect the selection but does not affect the consumption. 
The instrument used in this paper is the proportion of households in the settlement that has at 
least one migrant member abroad. The rationality behind this instrument is that settlements with 
a higher proportion of households with migrants have thicker migratory networks that reduce the 
cost associated with migration.  Household living in such areas are more likely to have sent 
migrants abroad and to receive remittances. On the other hand, once other observable 
characteristics have been controlled, living in areas with relatively more households with 
migratory experience should not affect consumption patterns, other than via the possibility of 
receiving remittances. 
Despite the advantages of this procedure, it still has some limitations. First, the contrafactual 
consumption aggregate has an artificially lower variance since it comes from the predicted values 
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of a regression21. Therefore, in judging the statistical significance of poverty and inequality 
indexes constructed with this aggregate, it would be advisable to narrow the confident levels.  
Second, and most importantly, the general equilibrium effects are missing. That is, households 
receiving remittances increase the aggregate demand in the economy, which is likely to generate 
new jobs and increase the income and consumptions of non-migrant families.        
7.2.2 Human capital  
In evaluating the effect of remittances on households’ human capital investments decisions, the 
methodological problems are slightly simpler than in the case of poverty and migration. The 
chosen variable to be explained is whether or not a child is enrolled at school. The basic question 
to be responded then is whether or not a child living in a household that receives remittances is 
more or less likely to be enrolled at school than other child living in a household that does not 
receive remittances. 
Obviously, characteristics of the child and household, other than the remittance receiver status, 
affect enrollment. What is more, many of the characteristics that affect enrollment are also likely 
to affect whether or not the household receives remittances. If all the characteristics were 
observable, they could be incorporated into a regression model explaining how they affect the 
probability of a child to be enrolled. Unfortunately, this is almost never the case. This is a classic 
case of endogeneity problem in one of the explanatory variables. Since remittance status is 
correlated with some unobservable characteristics, it is not easy to distinguish between its true 
effect on school enrollment and the effect the unobservable characteristic exert on enrollment via 
remittance status.    
The basic econometric models commonly used when the main interest is to explain how a set 
variables affect the probability of a certain binary outcome is the Probit, Logit or Linear 
Probability model. The main difference between the first two and the linear probability model is 
the introduction of non-linear relationships in the first two, which allow restricting the predicted 
probabilities between zero and one. This is not to say that the linear probability model is useless. 
Despite the possibility of predicted probabilities larger than one or lower than zero, it still gives 
unbiased estimations of the effect of the covariants if the classical OLS assumptions are met. 
Probit and Logit model differ from each other in the distributional assumptions made. The 
Probit model assumes probabilities to behave like a normal distribution, whereas the Logit as in 
logistic distribution. 
                                                     
21 In order to deal with this issue, a random noise term is added to the predicted consumption aggregate. This 
component has the variance of the errors of the consumption regression. This method has been also used by 
Barham & Boucher (1998) , Acosta, et al. ( 2007) and Beyene ( 2014) 
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Nevertheless, none of the previous model by itself will give unbiased results in the presence of an 
endogenous regressor. To deal with this problem, the standard approach is to use instrumental 
variables (IV). That is, a variable that is correlated with the endogenous variable, but uncorrelated 
with the other unobservable characteristics affecting the outcome variable. In short, the IV 
process breaks the variation of the endogenous regressor in two parts, one correlated with the 
instrument, and one correlated with the unobservable characteristics; and use only the part 
related to the instrument in the regression with the outcome variable.  
Many of the authors reviewed previously22 decided to use an instrumental variable approach 
along with a Probit Model to estimate the effect of migration on school attendance. However, the 
estimation of a so-called “IV-Probit” assume that the endogenous regressor is continuous, and 
therefore is not appropriate for a discrete variable as an endogenous regressor, as in the case of 
the status of the household as a remittance receiver.    
To deal with such problem, this paper follows the suggestion of Lewbel, et al. (2012) by 
estimating two simultaneous Probit equations. The first [is] for the probability of a child to be 
enrolled at school as a function of the observable individual, household and community 
characteristics, including the remittance-receiving status of the household. And the second for 
the probability of the household to receive remittances as function of the same variables used in 
the first Probit model, plus one exogenous regressor which is assumed not to affect the 
probability of school enrollment (other than via the remittances status) and hence  do not appear 
in the first model. In short, the model can be written as follows: 
   (           )   (       )  (6) 
   (           )   (       )  (7) 
Where Ej represents a categorical variable equal to one if the child j is enrolled at school, and 
zero otherwise, Xj is a vector of variables representing observable characteristics of the child, 
household, and community; Rj is a categorical variable equal to one if the household receives 
remittances, and zero otherwise; Zj is an exogenous variable that influence the probability of the 
household to receive remittances, but do not affect enrollment in another way; and Φ is the 
standard normal cumulative distribution function. 
As with consumption modeling, the instrument is the proportion of the household in the 
settlement that has at least one migrant member abroad. The logic is also the same. Thicker 
                                                     
22 Acosta (2006) and Nakamuro (2010), for instance 
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migrant networks decrease the cost of migration and make more likely that a house decide send 
some of their members abroad and receive remittances, but on the other hand migrant’s 
networks should not influence the probability of a child to be enrolled at school, other than via 
the remittance effect. 
Notice, however, that if the parents consider the child old enough, migratory networks might 
affect the likelihood of a child to become a migrant and, therefore, drop out from school. Since, 
only small portion of the migrants are below 18 years old (1.63%), this does not seem to be a 
serious problem for children at school age. Nevertheless, in order to minimize this possible threat 
to the design of the research, the analysis will be focused on children between 7 and 15 years old 
although some mentions are done for higher ages. 
As mentioned before, McKenzie & Rapoport, (2006) pointed that children in households with 
migrant members might have higher motivation to become migrants and drop out of school, or 
stayed enrolled if education is rewarded abroad. Nevertheless, this is partially why remittances 
have an apriori indeterminate effect on education, rather than an effect of the migratory networks 
outside the household.      
 
7. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS  
 
Section two gave a gross picture of the evolution of poverty, inequality and school enrollment in 
Tajikistan. This section presents some extra figures for the year 2007 directly computed from the 
TLSMS 2007. It also presents the indices of poverty, inequality, and school enrollment divided 
accordingly to the remittance receiver status of the household, as directly observed in the TLSMS 
2007.  These figures will be later useful to guide the discussion of the results in section 823.     
7.1 Poverty 
In Tajikistan, rural and urban areas other than the capital city have a similar proportion of people 
living in poverty, 55%, and 52.9% respectively. Moreover, statistically speaking, it is not possible 
to reject that the difference between both areas is different from zero24.  Nevertheless, since the 
majority of the population (over 70%) lives in rural areas, the number of people living in poverty 
in such areas account for as much as 75.7% of the total population living in poverty. On the 
other hand, in the capital city Dushanbe, the headcount ratio is lower, although is still 
                                                     
23 For a complete poverty profile of Tajikistan in 2007  see The World Bank (2009) 
24 An adjusted Wald test for the difference between both indexes gives a F-statistic of 0.26 with a p-value of 0.6126 
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considerably high at 43.3%. Thus, it seems then that poverty is not exclusively a problem of rural 
(or urban) areas.  
Chart 7 – Poverty by area 
  
Data source: TLSMS 2007 
Regionally speaking, the highest poverty rate is found in Suhgd with 68.8% of its population 
living under the poverty line.  The Districts of Republican Subordination follows Suhgd with 
48.8%, then the Khatlon region with 47.3%, the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region with 
43.4% and finally Dushanbe with 43.3% 
 
Table 2 – Poverty rates by region 
 Dushanbe Suhgd Khatlon DRS GBAO 
Headcount Ratio 43.3% 68.8% 47.3% 48.8% 43.4% 
Share in total poverty 7.6% 38.1% 31.5% 20.2% 2.5% 
Data source: TLSMS 2007 
Other relevant characteristics of households below the poverty line are a female head and low 
levels of education of the head. Households with a female head have a poverty incidence of 
57.2%, whereas households with a male head have a poverty incidence of 52.8%. Households 
with a head with completed secondary education have a poverty incidence of 54.5%, significantly 
lower than households with a head with the immediately lower level (basic education) which have 
a poverty incidence of 61.2%. Even more difficult is the situation for households in which the 
head has no formal education: 67% of such households are below the poverty line. On the other 
43.3% 
52.9% 
55.0% 
7.6% 
16.7% 
75.7% 
Dushanbe Other Urban Rural
Headcount Ratio Share in total poverty
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extreme, households with a head with higher education have a poverty incidence of around 37%. 
Although, this indicates that even a higher education diploma is not an automatic pass out of 
poverty.  
Table 3 – Poverty and sex of the household head 
 Male Head Female Head 
Households 84.3% 15.7% 
Headcount ratio 52.8% 57.2% 
 Data source: TLSMS 2007 
Table 4 – Poverty and education of the household head 
 None Primary Basic Secondary Higher 
Percentage of Households 4.5% 6.6% 12.8% 59.1% 17.1% 
Headcount ratio 67.0% 62.8% 61.2% 54.6% 37.0% 
Data source: TLSMS 2007 
The directly observed poverty indicators for the general population and the population divided 
by remittance-receiver status are presented in Table 5 below. As can be observed, a lower 
proportion of people below the poverty line is found among those living in households receiving 
remittances, in comparison with people living in non-receiving households, as reflected by the 
headcount index. The Poverty Gap Index shows that even poor households receiving remittances 
are better in average than poor households not receiving remittances, as the former ones are in 
average closer to the poverty line than later ones. In other words, the average consumption per 
capita of poor households that receive remittances is higher than the average consumption per 
capita of poor households not receiving remittances. The poverty severity index tells a similar 
story since more households with not receiving remittances “fall well below” the poverty line 
than households with remittances. 
Table 5 - Poverty indicators complete poverty line (138.7 Tajik Somoni per month per person) 
Index General 
population 
Remittances 
receiving 
Population 
Non-remittance 
receiving population 
Difference 
Headcount Ratio 0.535 
(0.0123) 
0.482 
(0.0203) 
0.545 
(0.0139) 
-0.063*** 
(0.0236) 
Poverty Gap Index 
(FGT 1.0) 
0.150 
(0.0059) 
0.13 
(0.0082) 
0.154 
(0.0063) 
-0.024*** 
(0.0084621) 
Poverty Severity 
Index (FGT 2.0) 
0.058 
(0.0031) 
0.048 
(0.0039) 
0.060 
(0.0034) 
-0.012*** 
(.00424) 
Data source: TLSMS 2007 
Notes: Linearized Standard Errors reported in parenthesis for HCR, FGT 1 and FGT2. Bootstrapped standard 
errors reported for the difference of the indexes. 
 *** Significant at 1%, **Significant at 5%, *Significant at 10% 
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7.2 Inequality  
Although urban areas (excluding the capital) and rural areas have fairly similar poverty incidence, 
there are significant differences in terms of inequality. All the considered measures of inequality 
point at the urban areas other than the capital as the most unequal areas in the country, the rural 
areas as the less unequal, and  Dushanbe in the middle, although closer to the inequality levels of 
other urban areas.  
Table 6 - Inequality by geographical area 
 (1) 
General 
Population 
(2) 
Dushanbe 
(3) 
Other 
Urban 
(4) 
Rural 
Differences 
(2)-(3) (2)-(4) (3)-(4) 
Gini coefficient 0.288*** 
(0.0068) 
0.328*** 
(0.0125) 
0.376*** 
(0.0219) 
0.254*** 
(0.0063) 
-0.048** 
(0.0251) 
0.074*** 
(0.0136) 
0.122*** 
(0.0232) 
Mean log deviation  
 (GE 0) 
0.140*** 
(0.0068) 
0.180*** 
(0.0138) 
0.241*** 
(0.0293) 
0.107*** 
(0.0064) 
-0.061** 
(0.0326) 
0.073*** 
(0.0147) 
0.134*** 
(0.0307) 
Theil Index  
(GE 1) 
0.176*** 
(0.0068) 
0.202*** 
(0.0201) 
0.333*** 
(0.0539) 
0.123*** 
(0.0135) 
-0.132** 
(0.0582) 
0.079*** 
(0.0230) 
0.210*** 
(0.0573) 
Data source: TLSMS 2007 
Notes: Bootstrapped standard errors reported in parentheses.  
*** Significant at 1%, **Significant at 5%, *Significant at 10% 
 
One advantage of the mean log deviation and the Theil index is the possibility to split their values 
in two: a part due to inequality between groups (or geographical areas), and a part due to 
inequality among individual’s within-groups. Doing so for the general population indexes shows 
that almost all the observable inequality is explained by the variation of expenditure of individuals 
within the geographical areas. Only around 2% or 3% of the observed inequality is attributable to 
differences between the rural and urban areas.  
Table 7 - Inequality by geographical area, decomposition 
 
General population Within group Inequality 
Between-group 
Inequality 
Mean log deviation  
 (GE 0) 
0.140 0.137 0.0037 
Theil Index (GE 1) 0.176 0.172 0.0038 
Data source: TLSMS 2007 
 
Regarding inequality in Tajikistan regions, all the measures presented in Table 8 agree in the fact 
that the most unequal region is Suhgd, which is also the region with the highest poverty 
incidence. Nevertheless, statistically speaking, the differences between the Gini and the mean log 
deviations in Suhgd and the indexes in Dushanbe are not significant. However, the difference 
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between Theil indexes is statistically significant25. This is interesting since the Theil index is 
known to be more sensitive to the changes in the upper part of the distribution than the mean 
log deviation.  Thus, this indicates that in Suhgd the upper part of the distribution is more 
unequal than in any other region of Tajikistan. Indeed, by computing an entropy index with a 
higher sensitivity to changes in the upper part of the distribution (a GE 2), the value for Suhgd is 
0,797 followed by Dushanbe with 0.299.  
Table 8  - Inequality by geographical region 
 Dushanbe Suhgd Khatlon DRS GBAO 
Gini coefficient 0.328*** 
(0.0119) 
0.358*** 
(0.0188) 
0.211*** 
(0.0050) 
0.273*** 
(0.0106) 
0.252*** 
(0.0114) 
Mean log deviation  
 (GE 0) 
0.1797*** 
(0.0133) 
0.219*** 
(0.0245) 
0.073*** 
(0.0035) 
0.123*** 
(0.0114) 
0.108*** 
(0.0111) 
Theil Index (GE 1) 0.202*** 
(0.0194) 
0.316*** 
(0.0477) 
0.076*** 
(0.0041) 
0.146*** 
(0.0259) 
0.123*** 
(0.0182) 
Data source: TLSMS 2007 
Notes: Bootstrapped standard errors reported in parentheses.  
*** Significant at 1%, **Significant at 5%, *Significant at 10% 
 
Decomposing the mean log deviations and the Theil index shows that, similarly to the case of the 
decomposition by rural and urban areas, most of the inequality corresponds to inequality within 
regions, rather than inequality between regions.  
Table 9 - Inequality by geographical regions, decomposition 
 General population Within group Inequality 
Between-group 
Inequality 
Mean log deviation  
 (GE 0) 
0.140 0.138 0.002 
Theil Index (GE 1) 0.176 0.174 0.002 
Data source: TLSMS 2007 
 
In the same way as with the actual poverty levels, some of the most common inequality measures, 
estimated using the observable data, are presented in Table 10 below. The Gini coefficient, the 
mean log deviation, and the Theil index are presented for the general population, as well as for 
the population in households receiving remittances and in households not receiving remittances.  
 
                                                     
25 The P-values for the null hypothesis that the difference between Ginis is equal to zero is 0.181; for the difference 
between mean log deviations:  0.163; and for Theil indexes:  0.026.  
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Table 10 - – Inequality measures for actual consumption 
 General 
Population 
No Receiving 
Remittances 
Receiving 
Remittances 
Difference Decomposition 
Within 
Group 
inequality 
Between-
group 
inequality 
Gini coefficient 0.288 
(0.0068) 
0.285 
(0.0072) 
0.298 
(0.0201) 
-0.012 
(0.0212) 
- - 
Mean log deviation  
 (GE 0) 
0.140 
(0.0068) 
0.138 
(0.0079) 
0.152 
(0.0238) 
-0.014 
(0.0528) 
 
0.1398 0.00045 
Thail Index (GE 1) 0.176 
(0.0068) 
0.169 
(0.0153) 
0.206 
(0.0509) 
-0.037 
(0.0249) 
0.1756 0.00046 
Data source: TLSMS 2007 
Notes: Bootstrapped standard errors reported in parentheses.  
*** Significant at 1%, **Significant at 5%, *Significant at 10% 
 
The Gini coefficient for both subpopulations is fairly similar, and, as a result, both indexes are 
similar to the general population Gini. Moreover, the difference between both Ginis is not 
statistically significant. The mean log deviation and the Theil Index show a slightly higher 
inequality for households receiving remittances, but again the difference is not statistically 
significant. The decomposition of these last two measures indicates that the inequality between 
groups (households receiving remittances, and households not receiving remittances) is 
considerably lower that the inequality within each group.  
All in all, the reported measures indicate that there are not significant differences in inequality 
between households receiving remittances and households not receiving remittances.   
 
7.3 School Enrollment 
The data for school enrollment by age group coming from the TLSMS 2007 resembles the data 
of enrollment by school level presented in Chart 8 in section two. After all, the age groups are 
constructed to follow the expected age range at each level of education accordingly to table 11. 
Nevertheless, a difference in primary education is evident.  This difference arises mainly due to 
children recently having turned seven years old by the time survey and not enrolled in any 
previous school program, as well as late starters. The enrollment rate for the ages of seven and 
eight years old depict this situation quite clearly. By the age of seven, only 28% of the children are 
enrolled at school, but by the age of eight the proportion has soared up to 95%. 
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Another point made by the data of enrollment by age group is the low percentage of children 
attending to preschool: Only 6.3% of those children between three and five years old were 
enrolled in preschool during the time frame of the survey.  
Table 11 - Enrollment rates by age group. 
 
3 to 6  7 to 10 11 to 15 16 to 19 20 to 24 25 + 
Percentage enrolled at school 6.29% 78.13% 95.02% 48.71% 10.78% 1.03% 
Standard error 0.009 0.0100 0.0063 0.0129 0.0077 0.0016 
Data source: TLSMS 2007 
In a comparison by sex and age group of the individuals, boys have consistently lower enrollment 
rates than girls. Although the difference in the age group from 7 to 10 years old is not statistically 
significant, the gap is expanded for the two next age groups, and remains significant for the age 
group from 20 to 24 years old and for the population in school age in general. It is noticeable 
how during the age corresponding to secondary school, at the end of compulsory education, girls 
are the ones who suffer the most acute  reduction, more than 54 percentage points, while boys’ 
enrollment is reduced by (a still large) 37% percentage points.  
Table 12 - Enrollment by age group and sex 
 3 to 6 7 to 10 11 to 15 16 to 19 20 to 24 25 + 6 to 24 
Boys 7.67% 7.87% 97.3% 60.3% 18.1% 1.1% 63.3% 
 
(0.0136) (0.0143) (0.0050) (0.0161) (0.0142) (0.0019) (0.0080) 
Girls 4.94% 7.75% 92.6% 38.0% 5.3% 1.0% 49.3% 
 
(0.0081) (0.0129) (0.0103) (0.0190) (0.0065) (0.0018) (0.0089) 
Difference 2.73%** 1.28% 4.64%*** 22.37%*** 12.77%*** 0.11% 13.98%*** 
 (0.0125) (0.0186) (0.0086) (0.0195) (0.0126) (0.0022) (0.0099) 
Data source: TLSMS 2007 
Notes: Linearized Standard Errors reported in parenthesis for the enrollment rates by sex and age. Bootstrapped 
standard errors reported for the difference between rates.  
*** Significant at 1%, **Significant at 5%, *Significant at 10% 
 
Finally, of especial interest are the differences in enrollment rates among children living in 
households that receive remittances and children living in households not receiving remittances. 
As can be appreciated in Table 12, for individuals aged 6 to 24 years old and living in households 
that no receive remittances, the enrollment rate is higher than for those living in households 
receiving remittances. Interestingly, this difference is driven by girls. While boys have no 
significant difference in their enrollment rates, a girl living in households that receive remittances 
have a significant lower enrollment rate than girls living in households that do not receive 
remittances.  
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Table 13 - Enrollment by remittance-receiving status and sex of the child 
 Boys and Girls Boys Girls 
No remittances receivers 
56.6% 63.3% 50.2% 
(0.0056) (0.0080) (0.0077) 
Remittances receivers 
53.2% 63.6% 44.5% 
(0.0125) (0.0183) (0.0165) 
Difference 
3.4%** -0.3% 5.7%*** 
(0.0136) (0.0197) (0.0182) 
Data source: TLSMS 2007 
Notes: Bootstrapped standard errors reported in parentheses for the difference between enrollment rates.  
*** Significant at 1%, **Significant at 5%, *Significant at 10% 
 
A negative correlation is also noticeable between remittances and enrollment by age group, as is 
depicted in Chart 8. Nonetheless, the difference is only statistically significant for the age groups 
from 3 to 5 years old and from 20 to 24 years old26.  
Chart 8 - - Enrollment by remittance-receiving status and age group 
 
Data source: TLSMS 2007 
 
7.4 Migrants Characteristics  
Households that receive remittances represent 15.5% of households in Tajikistan. Geographically 
speaking, these households represent up to 12.2% in urban areas and 16.6% in rural areas. Across 
                                                     
26 P- values for the adjusted Wald test with the null hypothesis of the difference between enrollment rates is equal to 
zero: Ages 3 to 5: 0.0078 ; ages 6 to 10: 0.7616; ages 11 to 15: 0.1750; ages 16 to 19: 0.7031; ages 20 to 24: 0.0100  
6.9% 
64.6% 
95.3% 
48.9% 
11.5% 
2.9% 
63.8% 
93.1% 
47.7% 
6.9% 
3 to 5 6 to 10 11 to 15 16 to 19 20 to 24
Non receivers Receivers
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regions, Dushanbe, Suhgd, and Khatlon have a similar proportion of households receiving 
remittances while RRS and GBO have the heist proportion with 20.9% and 28.1% respectively.   
Table 14 – Household receiving remittances by area and region 
 Total Urban Rural Dushanbe Suhgd Khatlon RRS GBAO 
Receiver 
Households 
15.5% 12.2% 16.6% 13.5% 13.5% 13.1% 20.9% 28.1% 
(0.0090) (0.0118) (0.0115) (0.0127) (0.0186) (0.0127) (0.0233) (0.0344) 
NonReceiver 
Households 
84.5% 87.8% 83.4% 86.5% 86.5% 86.9% 79.1% 71.9% 
(0.0090) (0.0118) (0.0115) (0.0127) (0.0186) (0.0127) (0.0233) (0.0344) 
Data source: TLSMS 2007 
Notes: Standard errors reported in parentheses 
In the expenditure distribution, households that receive remittances are found in practically the 
same proportion in the lowest two quintiles, around 13% or 14%. The third and fourth quintiles 
have a slightly higher proportion, although due to sampling error, is not possible to assure that 
the difference is significant. The fifth quintile has the highest proportion of households receiving 
remittances, and the gap between this quintile and the bottom two is statistically significant27.   
Chart 9 - Remittances receiver households by expenditure quintile 
 
Data source: TLSMS 2007 
Finally, the TLSMS 2007 includes some characteristics of the migrants that are relevant for this 
paper. First, the average age of the migrants registered in the survey was 28.3 years old, with a 
standard deviation of 9.3 years. The median age was 26 years old. The youngest migrant 
registered was only one-year-old while the oldest migrant was 86 years old. However, the 80% of 
                                                     
27 P-values for the adjusted Wald test are: difference between the fourth and first quintile, 0.1346; difference between 
the fifth and the first quintiles, 0.0191; difference between the fifth and the second quintiles, 0.0255 
13.4% 13.9% 
15.8% 16.2% 
18.1% 
First Second Third Fourth Fifth
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the migrants are between 20 and 40 years old. The vast majority of migrants are males; with up to 
93.48% of the registered migrants were men.  
In educational terms, for the migrants aged 20 to 40 years old, 2.3% have completed only primary 
education, 14.5% basic education, 75.6% secondary education and 7.6% higher education. The 
completion rates for the general population in Tajikistan aged 20 to 40 years old are 2.6% for 
primary, 17.1% for basic, 71.6% with secondary education,  and 8.4%with higher. This 
comparison suggests a slightly better-educated migrant than those staying in Tajikistan. However, 
a conclusion is not possible without knowing the properties of the migrant’s sample. 
As was pointed out in the previous section most of the migrants choose the Russian Federation 
as their destiny.  There is no difference in this regard with the migrants registered in TLSMS 
2007. Up to 95.3% of all migrants are currently living in the Russian Federation. Also, as 
explained before, the ability to speak Russian seems to play an important role in the decided 
destiny: almost 85% of the migrants speak Russian. 
Finally, almost 27% of the registered migrants were working before leaving the country while 
66.4% were unemployed, 5.6% were students, and 1% were in the military. The most common 
occupation declared were “Building finishers and related trades”, with 24.3%, and “Market 
gardeners and crop growers” with 18.75% 
 
8. RESULTS 
This section presents and discusses the results of the estimation process made to evaluate the 
effects of remittances on poverty, inequality and school enrollment. The first subsection deals 
with poverty and inequality, and is further divided into:  first, the description of variables used to 
compute the per capita consumption level in the case of no remittances and the results of the 
estimations, and, second, the results of the computation of the poverty and inequality measures 
using the contrafactual consumption and its comparison with the actual poverty and inequality 
measures.  
The second subsection is devoted to the effects of remittances on school enrollment. Again, the 
subsection starts by discussing the variables incorporated in the estimation model and continues 
with the discussion of the results.  
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9.1 Poverty and Inequality 
9.1.1 Estimating the no-remittance household expenditure  
In order to estimate the poverty and inequality levels in the hypothetical case of no remittances, 
per capita consumption levels need to be estimated for households as if they were not receiving 
remittances.   To do so, consumption per capita is modeled as a function of observable regional, 
community and household characteristics known to be likely to affect per capita expenditure 
levels.   
Haughton & Khandker (2009) in the World Bank’s Handbook on Poverty and Inequality classify 
a series of characteristics affecting per capita expenditure levels. Among the regional (or national) 
characteristics, the authors highlight the role of geographic variables such as the isolation of the 
territory, the relative resource abundance, or the climate. Institutional variables, such as effective 
protection of property rights, good governance, among others, also play a role in the national or 
regional level. In the community level, infrastructure is a key element affecting poverty, for 
instance, access to electricity, paved roads, schools and medical clinics. Social capital, “which 
includes, for instance, the level of mutual trust in the community” 28 have also an important role 
in poverty since facilitates cooperation and conflict resolution.  
Household, and individual, characteristics affecting consumption per capita include demographic, 
economic and social aspects. Demographic characteristics include the size of the household, the 
age of its members, and the gender of the household head. Economic characteristics are mostly 
related to the employment status of the household members, their employment characteristics 
(such as the hours worked), and the property of the household. Social indicators include health, 
education and shelter (mostly housing) characteristics. 
For the particular case of Tajikistan, the household characteristics to be included in the 
consumption equation mainly follow the previous literature with the number of children (14 
years or younger), adults (between 15 and 64 years old) and elderlies (more than 65)   in the 
household. Educational attainment is captured by the   educational level of the adult members of 
the household (number of people with primary, secondary or higher education).   
Other variables included are the number of people employed in the household and geographical 
location variables (identifying provinces) to capture regional characteristics that might affect 
consumption levels and poverty. 
                                                     
28 Putnam (1995) in Haughton & Khandker (2009, pp. 148) 
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Household head characteristics such as sex, educational level and employment status are also 
included separately in the characteristics of the other adult members, since the head of the 
household usually plays a determinant role in the household decisions regarding consumption 
and resource allocation. 
Wealth characteristics of the household proved to be more difficult to include, as the TLSMS 
does not contain information regarding savings, debts or assets in non-agricultural businesses. 
Most of the people report to be owners of the dwelling they inhabit, but most of them refuse or 
do not know the approximate market rent value of the dwelling29. The only mostly complete 
information is the approximate value of the house, captured by the question of how much the 
owner have paid or will pay for the dwelling. Nevertheless, even this information seems noisy 
with some values as low as 1 or 2 Tajik Somoni. There is, however, complete information on the 
physical characteristics of the dwelling and the durable goods owned by the household.  Since 
wealthier families are likely to live in dwellings built with better quality construction materials, 
with more rooms and other amenities, and durable goods owned by the family are directly related 
to its wealth, this information is used to construct an asset index using the principal component 
method30.  
At the community level, isolation and geographic characteristics are considered by including the 
altitude in which dwellings are located. Rather than measure isolation in a more common way by 
using the distance to the capital city and/or to the administrative center or the region, for the 
particular case of Tajikistan, one of the most mountainous countries in the world, altitude is 
preferred since it is likely to capture how difficult the access to a settlement could be. Households 
in higher altitudes in Tajikistan are also likely to face more adverse climatic conditions than other 
households in lower altitudes.  
Access to running water and shorter time to travel to medical services might facilitate the 
household members to engage in economic activities, thus having a positive effect on 
expenditure. These variables, although normally associated with the community level, are rather 
taken from the household questionnaire since considerable less missing values are found, as well 
as more variation in the data and possible more accurate estimations. 
                                                     
29 A simple OLS regression was adjusted on the value of the reported rent and the characteristics of the household, 
but the adjustment of the regression was extremely low (R-square of 0.024)  
30 Intuitively, the first principal component is a linear combination of a set of variables that captures the largest 
amount of information common to such variables.   See Filmer & Pritchett (2001) for a description of the method 
and its empirical validation, and Appendix 1 for the variables included in the index.  
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One usual variable included in many of the poverty analysis, but the absence of this one is 
electricity access. The reason to exclude such variable was the lack of variation in the sample. 
From the households surveyed, less than 2% did not have access to electricity. What is more, the 
relevant question was made only at the community level (as “what part of the houses in this 
population point have electricity or generators”), so it is not accurate measure for whether or not 
the surveyed household had electricity or not.   
A summary of the variables used in the consumption and selection equation is given in the table 
below 
Table 15 - Variables included in the estimation of expenditure aggregate 
Variable Definition 
lppcd Log per capita expenditure 
 - Household composition - 
ch14r Number of children aged 14 or younger 
ad14r  Number of adults aged 15 to 64 years old 
elder Number of adults aged 65 years or older 
 - Household Social 
nprimaryr Number of adult members with primary education as last educational level coursed (excluding 
the household head) 
nbasicr Number of adult members with basic education as last educational level coursed (excluding the 
household head) 
nsecondr Number of adult members with secondary education as last educational level coursed (excluding 
the household head) 
nhigherr Number of adult members with higher education as last educational level coursed (excluding the 
household head) 
 - Household economics 
empl_propr Proportion of employed people in the household 
Index_ha  Household asset idex 
Land1 Own land are used for farming (sotka) 
 - Household Head Characteristics  
HH_sex Sex of the household head 
hh_primary Household head last /maximum educational level is primary school  
hh_basic Household head last /maximum educational level is basic school 
hh_second Household head last /maximum educational level is secondary school 
hh_higher Household head last /maximum educational level is higher education 
 - Community level Characteristics 
acwatter Household has access to piped water 
timesch Time to the nearest primary school (household questionnaire) 
timedoc Time to the nearest doctor (household questionnaire) 
 - Regional level Characteristics  
i.Oblast Categorical variable for each Oblast 
 - Additional variables for  the selection equation 
non_receiver Categorical variable equal to one for  non-remittance receiver households, zero otherwise  
migr_hh2 Proportion of households in the community that receive remittances (estimated from the 
household survey) 
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As explained in the methodology section, simple OLS would yield bias result due to self-selection 
problems in the sample. To control for this issue, a Heckman Selection Model was used to 
estimate consumption per capita. The results, reported in Table 16, are interesting in their own 
right. Results are reported for the whole country (columns 1A and 1B) as well as for the urban 
and rural areas separately (columns 2A and 2B, and 3A and 3B respectably).  
In the selection equations (columns B), the proportion of households in the settlement that 
receive remittances is negatively and significantly related to the probability of not receiving 
remittances. In the consumption equation (columns A), the number of people in the household, 
regardless of its age, is negatively related to the consumption per capita in the household, 
although its significance vary depending if the sample considers all the households or just rural or 
urban households.  
The number of people by educational level has a positive and significant effect on consumption 
per capita for the whole sample, and for the urban households. Nevertheless, for the rural 
households no significant effect is found. This, however, is not a usual result accordingly to 
Haughton & Khandker (2009). Indeed, Glewwe (1991) for Côte d’Ivoire found that human 
capital stock in the household (approximated by the educational level of the most educated male 
and female) have little or no effect on household consumption. One of the hypotheses advanced 
by Glewwe is that education has few returns in agriculture, as many of the crops cultivated in the 
country (root crops) are not susceptible to intensive modern agricultural techniques. 
Nevertheless, further research would be needed to make this point completed clear in Tajikistan. 
Specially, considering that up to 60% of the working population in rural areas is employed in 
activities other than agriculture. On the other hand, the high unemployment rate (around 37% in 
Tajikistan rural area) might bring wage differences down and reduce the education premium in 
activities other than agriculture. 
All the household economic characteristics considered, the per capita area of land used for 
agricultural activities, and the household asset index, have a positive and significant relationship 
with the expenditure per capita. As explained before, land and assets are indicators of the wealth 
of the household. Wealthier households are expected to have higher incomes (since wealth have 
been accumulated trough pass earnings), but also wealth can be used to “smooth” consumption 
in the case of negative shocks to current earnings.  
Among the household head characteristics, only its sex and whether or not the head has higher 
education have a significant effect on expenditure per capita.  If the household head is a woman, 
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the expenditure per capita in the household is expected to decrease an average of 14% for the 
whole sample, and 18% of the rural sample. Nevertheless, no significant effect was found for the 
urban sample. If the household head has a higher education diploma, the expenditure per capita 
is expected to increase by 11% for the whole sample and for the urban sample. 
At least two explanations for the lower consumption of households headed by a female seem 
reasonable. First, female heads have much lower labor participation than their male counterparts: 
30% are employed against 69% of the males. Second, even when females decide to participate in 
the labor market, their earnings are in average lower than for males. A gross average of monthly 
earnings by sex shows that females have an average wage of 167.4 Somoni, while males earned an 
average of 411.0 Somoni. A simple wage regression also shows that females with the same 
education and age (as a proxy of experience) than males, would earn approximately half of the 
wages of the males. Of course, assessing correctly the magnitude of the difference and why this is 
the case requires further research. 
Regarding the community level characteristics, none of them seems to have a significant effect on 
the household consumption per capita. Altitude apparent negative correlation disappears, once 
other controls are included. Thus, it seems that more than the altitude itself, household 
characteristics such as education and wealth, and regional particular characteristics, has a larger 
effect on household expenditure. A similar argument is valid for the lack of significance for the 
time necessary to visit a doctor or attend the nearest school. What is more, the travel time is not 
extremely long for the majority of the households: 90% of them have to travel less than 30 
minutes to reach the nearest primary school, and less than 40 minutes to visit the nearest doctor. 
Hence, it seems that households, in general, do not have to divert too much time from economic 
activities for their children to attend school or access medical care.  
Interestingly, however, the access to piped water has a negative sign, although statistically not 
significant. This seems to be the result of introducing the household asset index, which contains 
many variables that are closely related with the access to piped water. For instance, if the dwelling 
has a flush toilet, it is almost certain that it will have access to piped water.  
Finally, the regional dummies show that households in the Khatlon region have a higher 
expenditure per capita, once the other characteristics have been taken into account. 
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Table 16 - Heckman selection Model Results 
 (1A) (1B) (2A) (2B) (3A) (3B) 
VARIABLES Consumption 
Country 
Selection 
Country 
Consumption 
rural 
Selection 
rural 
Consumption 
Urban 
Selection 
urban 
Selection variable       
migr_hh2  -1.818***  -1.393***  -2.268*** 
  (0.233)  (0.443)  (0.257) 
Household  
Composition 
      
ch14r -0.0688*** 0.00569 -0.114*** 0.00709 -0.0562*** 0.00959 
 (0.00524) (0.0188) (0.0119) (0.0335) (0.00478) (0.0233) 
ad14r -0.0972*** -0.146** -0.0702* -0.0231 -0.0816** -0.202** 
 (0.0165) (0.0709) (0.0409) (0.147) (0.0328) (0.0895) 
elder -0.0946*** -0.0443 -0.109** -0.0914 -0.0874*** -0.0472 
 (0.0226) (0.0838) (0.0540) (0.188) (0.0230) (0.102) 
Household 
education 
characteristics 
      
nprimaryr 0.0411** 0.0641 -0.0397 -0.0526 0.0500** 0.114 
 (0.0202) (0.0829) (0.0480) (0.177) (0.0230) (0.103) 
nbasicr 0.0387** -0.0505 -0.0394 -0.106 0.0504*** -0.00315 
 (0.0155) (0.0733) (0.0397) (0.150) (0.0189) (0.0937) 
nsecondr 0.0528*** -0.0125 -0.00732 -0.140 0.0592*** 0.0501 
 (0.0156) (0.0735) (0.0413) (0.154) (0.0179) (0.0951) 
nhigherr 0.115*** 0.0371 0.0715 -0.113 0.118*** 0.112 
 (0.0204) (0.0784) (0.0463) (0.151) (0.0269) (0.103) 
Household 
economic 
characteristics 
      
emplr 0.0234*** 0.114*** 0.0484** 0.136** 0.00393 0.124*** 
 (0.00873) (0.0245) (0.0185) (0.0541) (0.0207) (0.0297) 
Land_pc 0.00440*** -0.00190 0.00514*** -0.016*** 0.00435*** 0.00274 
 (0.00118) (0.00380) (0.00172) (0.00308) (0.00126) (0.00582) 
index_ha 0.0760*** -0.0346* 0.0590*** -0.089*** 0.0746*** -0.0163 
 (0.00849) (0.0205) (0.00777) (0.0257) (0.0144) (0.0474) 
Household head 
characteristics 
      
HH_sex -0.117*** -0.686*** -0.181*** -0.537*** -0.0326 -0.758*** 
 (0.0317) (0.0812) (0.0405) (0.127) (0.139) (0.0985) 
HH_age -0.000715 0.0156 0.00153 0.0192 0.000797 0.00528 
 (0.00454) (0.0157) (0.00982) (0.0267) (0.00490) (0.0250) 
sqHH_age 1.57e-05 -0.000142 -6.83e-06 -0.000193 3.09e-06 -3.58e-05 
 (4.23e-05) (0.000145) (9.80e-05) (0.000252) (4.42e-05) (0.000233) 
hh_primary 0.0177 -0.0392 0.184 -0.382 -0.0205 0.00522 
 (0.0577) (0.167) (0.175) (0.466) (0.0533) (0.199) 
hh_basic -0.0149 -0.275* 0.199 -0.501 -0.0335 -0.275 
 (0.0609) (0.156) (0.179) (0.458) (0.0561) (0.180) 
hh_second 0.00565 -0.225 0.138 -0.459 0.00163 -0.219 
 (0.0592) (0.154) (0.185) (0.394) (0.0498) (0.182) 
hh_higher 0.106* -0.211 0.241 -0.142 0.0933 -0.299 
 (0.0634) (0.178) (0.182) (0.429) (0.0592) (0.220) 
Uzbek -0.0336 0.00930 -0.0440 -0.170 -0.0337 0.0381 
 (0.0247) (0.0846) (0.0658) (0.162) (0.0247) (0.0971) 
Other 0.0814 0.157 0.00220 0.109 0.111 0.0972 
 (0.0698) (0.225) (0.0870) (0.234) (0.203) (0.522) 
Comunity level 
characteristics 
      
acwatter -0.0270 0.113 -0.0422 0.167 -0.0188 0.0574 
 (0.0299) (0.0847) (0.0463) (0.167) (0.0359) (0.121) 
altitude 9.15e-05 -0.0004** -0.000648 -0.00174 0.000143* -0.000151 
 (7.36e-05) (0.000172) (0.000496) (0.00105) (8.28e-05) (0.000234) 
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 (1A) (1B) (2A) (2B) (3A) (3B) 
VARIABLES Consumption 
Country 
Selection 
Country 
Consumption 
rural 
Selection 
rural 
Consumption 
Urban 
Selection 
urban 
sqaltitude -2.41e-08 6.11e-08 3.48e-07 5.23e-07 -3.52e-08 5.12e-09 
 (2.00e-08) (5.56e-08) (2.59e-07) (5.37e-07) (2.56e-08) (6.33e-08) 
timesch 0.000363 -0.00105 0.00165 0.00745 0.000154 -0.00138 
 (0.000623) (0.00178) (0.00225) (0.00731) (0.000627) (0.00210) 
timedoc 0.000321 0.00170 0.000872 0.00228 9.60e-05 0.00115 
 (0.000275) (0.00145) (0.000881) (0.00242) (0.000372) (0.00157) 
Regional dummies       
Dushanbe -0.149 0.0320 0.245 0.225 - - 
 (0.0949) (0.175) (0.400) (0.805)   
DRS -0.0535 0.206 0.238 0.0235 -0.0703 0.313* 
 (0.0964) (0.177) (0.379) (0.713) (0.107) (0.189) 
Sughd 0.231** 0.0866 0.529 0.105 0.246** 0.198 
 (0.0891) (0.178) (0.374) (0.753) (0.102) (0.211) 
Kathlon 0.155** 0.146 0.421 0.0804 0.167* 0.147 
 (0.0784) (0.168) (0.393) (0.783) (0.0909) (0.168) 
Location 0.161*** -0.115 - - - - 
 (0.0489) (0.104)     
Constant 4.964*** 2.918*** 5.158*** 3.161*** 5.092*** 3.010*** 
 (0.194) (0.554) (0.360) (1.059) (0.230) (0.620) 
/athrho 0.787***  1.051***  0.0878  
 (0.196)  (0.200)  (1.328)  
/lnsigma -0.818***  -0.668***  -0.967***  
 (0.0459)  (0.0652)  (0.0462)  
rho .6568582  .7821424  .0875801  
 (0.111401)  (.077827)  (1.31755)  
sigma (0.441236)  .5129674  .3803061  
 .0202402  (0.033458)  (.017564)  
lambda (0.28983)  .4012136  .0333072  
 (0.060684)  (0.062824)  (.502097)  
Observations 4,857  1,708  3,149  
Notes: Standard errors reported in parenthesis. The Region omitted in regressions (1) and (2) is GBAO   
*** Significant at 1%, **Significant at 5%, *Significant at 10% 
 
A word about the lambda coefficient is in place. This coefficient gives the direction of the 
selection bias. The statistical significance is not directly reported, but it 95% confident interval 
does not comprise zero. This implies that OLS estimates would have indeed been biased. The 
sign is indicating a positive selection into no-remittances. This can be interpreted as households 
that decide not to send any migrant abroad and receive remittances, do so because they 
unobservable characteristics are positively correlated with their consumption.   
9.1.2Poverty Measures for contrafactual consumption 
The results from the previous Heckman selection model are used to estimate the non-remittances 
per capita expenditure for households that are actually receiving remittances. In such scenario, 
returnee migrants and their characteristics are “added” to the computation of the household per 
capita consumption. The returnee migrants are assumed to retake their previous employment if 
they use to have one.  
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The predicted consumption for a remittance-receiving household is used, along with the actual 
consumption for non-receiving households, to recalculate the poverty indexes. Results are 
displayed in Table 17 below. 
The results indicate that in the case that no household would receive remittances, the percentage 
of households living in poverty would increase from 53.5% to 57.1%. The poverty gap index 
indicates that the average consumption per capita of households under the poverty line would 
experience a decrease. The poverty severity index, however, shows a no significance reduction. 
Table 17 - Poverty indicators no remittance scenario complete poverty line (138.7 TJS per month per 
person) 
Index Actual Measure No remittances scenario Difference 
Headcount Ratio 
0.535 
(0.0089) 
0.571 
(0.0089) 
-0.036 *** 
(0.0043) 
Poverty Gap Index 
(FGT 1.0) 
0.1500 
(0.0034) 
0.1527 
(0.0034) 
-0.0027** 
(0.0014) 
Poverty Severity Index (FGT 2.0) 
0.05798 
(0.0018) 
0.05718 
(0.0018) 
0.0008 
(0.0007) 
Data source: TLSMSM 2007 
Notes: Bootstrapped standard errors reported in parenthesis.  
*** Significant at 1%, **Significant at 5%, *Significant at 10% 
 
An even worse situation is depicted if poverty levels are estimated only for household receiving 
remittances. For such households, poverty levels would increase from the observed 48.2% up to 
67.1%. 
A reduction in the poverty incidence of around 3.6% due to remittances (although arguably a 
lower bound for it), is considerably lower than the previous estimates made by Betti & Lundgren 
(2012). In their paper, as mentioned above, they argue that without remittances poverty incidence 
in Tajikistan would increase between 27% and 33%. Several reasons explain this difference, many 
of which help to better understand the results of the current estimation procedure. 
First, the survey used by Betti & Lundgren (2012) was conducted in 2010, so in principle is 
possible that more households have migrants abroad, which could increase the observed effect of 
remittances on poverty. Their survey also has the advantage to come from an adaptive sample, 
that is, they sampled households in areas that previous surveys have identified as having a higher 
proportion of migrants. This makes a sample that better capture the characteristics of households 
with migrants (since more of them are included).  
 43 
 
However, the sample is not necessary representative of the general population, and, in fact, in 
their particular case it is not31. Thus, their inferences about the percentage of households 
receiving remittances in Tajikistan are most likely overstated since they come from a sample that 
was designed to overrepresented such households. They registered 73% of the households with 
one or more members living abroad while the TLSMS 2007 registered only 15.5%. Probably the 
percentage has increased between 2007 and 2010, but it is unlikely that in such large extent. 
Logically, if a larger proportion of households cease to receive remittances, provided that the 
same fraction of such household are below the poverty line, the increase in poverty would be 
higher. 
A second difference is how Betti & Lundgren constructed their “no-remittances” scenario. They 
simply assumed in their first scenario that remittances stop flowing, and in their second scenario 
that remittances stop flowing, and migrants have come back to their households. No income 
substitution is computed. On the contrary, on this paper, working with consumption, the 
returnee migrants are incorporated in the computation of the contrafactual consumption. 
A third different is the measure used to estimate poverty. While Betti & Lundgren prefer income, 
this paper uses expenditure. As previously explained, expenditure is less volatile to shocks in 
earnings while current income suffers the whole impact. This makes that the effect of a reduction 
in remittances (or any other source of income) larger on the measures of poverty based on 
income.  
It possible to argue that the capacity of the household to smooth consumption decreases as time 
passes without new sources of income. Thus, the effect found in the present evaluation might be 
thought as the immediate effect of the reduction of remittances. The long run effect is likely to 
be larger. 
Apart from the differences with previous research, the relatively low effect of remittances is also 
explained by the segments in the expenditure distribution where households receiving 
remittances are located. As shown in the previous section, a higher proportion of migrants is 
found in households in the upper quintile of the expenditure distribution. Similarly, a higher 
proportion of households receiving remittances are found in the upper quintiles32. This in 
principle suggests that many households receiving remittances were not poor in the first place, 
and, therefore, although their consumption would decrease in the no-remittance scenario, not all 
of them will fall into poverty. 
                                                     
31 Betti & Lundgren, 2012 (p. 403) 
32 See Table 19 in the next section 
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All in all, remittances are found to be associated with the reduction in poverty incidence, as well 
as the reduction of the poverty gap. The reduction in poverty incidence, however, seems to be 
relatively small compared with the previous estimations of Betti & Lundgren (2012). Two reasons 
explain this. First, methodological aspects likely overstate Betti & Lundgren estimations, and 
second, consumption (used in this paper) is less volatile than income (used in the Betti & 
Lundgren’s paper), and thus poverty measures based on income are also more volatile than those 
based on consumption. Apart from the differences with previous research, two considerations 
might prevent the results presented in here to capture the full effect of remittances on poverty. 
First, the methodology used in this paper is not capable to capture general equilibrium effects, 
and second, the data set possibly underestimate the households receiving remittances. However, 
more interestingly, as will be explored in depth in the next section, since many of the household 
receiving remittances are found in the middle and upper part of the expenditure distribution, 
stopping the remittances inflow does not necessary implies falling into poverty for them. 
Considering the previous arguments, the poverty reduction found should be treated as evidence 
of the effect of remittances on poverty and thought as a lower bound, rather than a definitive 
figure.   
 
9.1.3 Inequality measures for contrafactual consumption 
In the same fashion as with the effect of remittances on poverty, the assessment of the effect of 
remittances on inequality was made using the predicted per capita expenditure out of the 
Heckman selection model for household actually receiving remittances, and the observed per 
capita expenditure for households not receiving remittances. 
All of the indexes presented in Table 18 indicate that in the case that no household would receive 
remittance the inequality would be reduced. This implies that remittances are not being received 
equally by every segment of the consumption distribution, or by mostly households in the lower 
parts of the consumption distribution. On the contrary, households in upper parts of the 
distribution seem to receive more remittances. 
As with poverty, part of the explanation for the observed pattern is given by where in the 
expenditure distribution the households receiving remittances are coming. In the actual 
distribution, as the Table 19 shows, the highest the quintile the highest the proportion of 
households receiving remittances is. Certainly, the difference between the two first quintiles is not 
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statistically different from zero, but that is not the case for the difference between the fifth and 
first or second quintiles33.  
Table 18 – Inequality measures 
Index Actual Measure No remittances scenario Difference 
Gini coefficient 0.2878 
(0.0069) 
0.2696 
(0.0062) 
0.01823*** 
(0.0037) 
Mean log deviation  
 (GE 0) 
0.1402 
(0.0077) 
0.1237 
(0.0066) 
0.0165*** 
(0.0042) 
Theil Index (GE 1) 0.1759 
(0.0160) 
0.1540 
(0.0136) 
0.0219 ** 
(0.0096) 
Data source: TLSMS 2007 
Notes: Bootstrapped standard errors reported in parenthesis.  
*** Significant at 1%, **Significant at 5%, *Significant at 10% 
 
Without remittances, many of the households that use to receive them move to lower quintiles in 
the distribution. However, only those households moving to the second (or first) have the chance 
to become poor since the average per capita expenditure is some Tajik Somony below the 
poverty line.  As can be inferred from Table 19, many of the households in the fifth quintile left 
it, for the fourth or third quintile34, but still above the poverty line.  Similarly, some in the fourth 
quintile moved to the third, and some indeed to second.  
On the other hand, movements to upper quintiles or just no movement are also possible. Since, 
some of the migrants are assumed to return to their previous jobs, consumption per capita does 
not necessary has to decrease when migrants return.  
Table 19 - Household receiving remittances and average expenditure per capita by quintile 
 Quintile 1 2 3 4 5 
Observed 
distribution 
Households receiving 
remittances 
13.4% 13.9% 15.8% 16.2% 18.1% 
(0.0167) (0.0149) (0.0164) (0.0128) (0.0153) 
Average Expenditure 
per capita 
73.96 106.39 133.18 169.77 301.54 
(0.6807) (0.2800) (0.3593) (0.5236) 11.76139 
Contrafactual 
distribution 
Households that used 
to remittances 
12.4% 21.8% 24.7% 15.9% 2.6% 
(0.0175) (0.0185) (0.0186) (0.0142) (0.0057) 
Average Expenditure 
per capita 
74.95 105.73 129.18 160.66 280.16 
(0.7029) (0.2501) (0.2830) (0.4897) (9.5482) 
Data source: TLSMS 2007 and author estimations. 
Notes: Bootstrapped standard errors reported in parenthesis.  
                                                     
33 P-values for the adjusted Wald test are difference between: first and second quintiles  0.8204 ; first and fifth 
0.0191; fifth and second 0.0255 
34 in one of the replication, around 75% of the movements were to the two immediately inferior quintile 
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As explained in section 4, these findings are congruent with a situation in which the cost of 
migration prevents a higher proportion of poor households to send members abroad. 
Nevertheless, the differences in the proportion of households with migrants among the quintiles 
are not extremely large, and the type of work made by the migrants (mostly construction-related 
works), although not an unskilled job, is not a high qualified job. Thus, it is likely that the picture 
in 2007 shows part of the transition process in which lowering migration costs, for instance due 
to  the development of thicker migrant networks, allow more migrants from the lower parts of 
the distribution to migrate. Survey data from following years would be needed to confirm this 
hypothesis. 
In general terms, remittances are associated with an increase in consumption inequality in 
Tajikistan. As with poverty, an explanation to this is the fact that a higher proportion of 
households receiving remittances is found in the middle and higher part of the expenditure 
distribution. Since households already in a better economic position receive most of the 
remittances, this has the logical effect of increase inequality.    
9.1.4 Robustness checks  
As a manner to corroborate the previous results, the comparison between the observed poverty 
measures and those in the no-remittances scenario were performed again using an alternative 
poverty line.  The alternative poverty line was set at two-thirds of the mean consumption, giving 
a result of 88.9 Somoni per person per month, and roughly coincides with the “food poverty 
line”35 of 87.6 Somoni estimated by the World Bank using the TLSMS 2007 
The detailed results of the calculations are presented in Appendix 2. A few comments are in place 
here. By changing the poverty line to 87.6, the actual headcount ratio decreases 19.73% and the 
contrafactual headcount ratio to 19.11%. The small difference of 0.006, although statistically 
significant at 5% in the simulation, indicates an almost null effect of remittances on poverty. This 
is congruent with the position of households receiving remittances in the expenditure 
distribution. Since with the new poverty line the vast majority of recipient households were not 
poor in the first place, remittances have little or no effect on poverty.  
     
9.2 School Enrollment 
In order to inquire the effect that receiving remittances has on the probability of a child to be 
enrolled at school, the household decision regarding children’s schooling need to be modeled 
                                                     
35 This poverty line is based in the cost of a basket of food items necessary for satisfy a 2,250 caloric intake per 
person per day. 
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using a series of variables expected to influence such decision. If education, as in the human 
capital theory, is considered as a kind of investment decision in which present cost (actual 
disbursements as well as opportunity cost) are weighted against expected future benefits, 
variables affecting either the costs that the household faces, and variables affecting the possible 
benefits should have to be included. 
Since the parents have to allocate limited resources to their children, the composition of the 
household, household earnings, and the preferences of the parents need to be taken into account.  
For the particular case at hand, the age and sex of the children are incorporated into the decision 
model. It is likely that the older the children, the higher the labor opportunity cost for the 
household, and thus the probability of being enrolled at school diminish with the age of the child. 
Similarly, as the individual grow older, he or she has a shorter time to ripe the benefits of their 
investment in education. In a context of limited resources, parents might have to choose to invest 
in those children more likely to have the highest returns from education. Since typically, and in 
particular in Tajikistan, men have a larger labor force participation and have higher wages, this 
might bright a preference to invest in boys rather than girls as has been found in previous 
research for developing countries36.  
The parent’s educational level is likely to influence their perception of possible future returns of 
education for their children. Provided that education returns are positive, parents with more 
education are expected to dedicate more resources for the education of their children.  
Self-employment status of the parents is included as a measure of alternative activities for the 
children. If the parents have their own business, it would be easier for them to incorporate other 
members of the family including children.  
Other household characteristics are also likely to affect the enrollment of children. The number 
of children in the household, and the household size, in general, might increase the competition 
for resources, and hence decrease the individual probability to attend school.  The sex of the 
household head is also included since, as previously saw, households with a female head face, on 
average, worse economic conditions that households with a male head.  
Intuitively, the earnings of the household directly affect the possibilities that parents have to send 
their children to school. However, directly observed earnings might not be the best indicator of 
the availability of resources of the household in the educational context. For instance, in the 
                                                     
36 Previous research have also found a gap between education investments for boys and girls, see for instance  Maitra  
(2010) for Bangladesh and Sawada & Loksbin (2001) for rural Pakistan  
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occurrence of an unexpected temporary income shock, parents are not likely to immediately 
withdraw their children from school. Instead, they might resort to savings or selling other types 
of assets in order to maintain the household level of expenditure, including the educational 
expenditure. Thus, a more appropriate indicator for resource availability would be the wealth of 
the household. This is incorporated as it was done in the poverty and inequality analysis by using 
a household asset index.  
The distance or time that children need to travel to attend school is also likely to affect the 
enrollment of children. If children need to travel long distances, parents might regard the journey 
as inappropriate for young children. If the distance is too long, as it requires to be done by using 
public or private transportation vehicles, the cost of the journey might discourage parents to send 
their children to school. 
In the community and the regional level, the quality of the school infrastructure and teaching 
materials are likely to affect the views of the parents about the quality of the education and the 
future benefits to be perceived. It is also possible that parents in the rural area, as a higher 
proportion of the population work in agriculture, place less value on education than parents in 
urban areas where the benefits of higher education through higher salaries is more visible. 
Finally, remittances, as explained before, provide financial resources that would not be available 
for the households by income from labor activities or via access to credit markets. However, 
there is no guarantee that such extra resources would be spent on the education of the children. 
Other needs might be more urgent, or other uses might be preferred by the household.  
The list of the variables included in modeling the probability of a child to be enrolled in school is 
presented in Table 20 
Table 20 – School enrollment model variables 
Variable Definition 
 Child characteristics 
age Age of the child 
agesq Age of the child squared  
sex Sex (for different regressions) 
 Parents Characteristics 
educ_mon Father’s years of schooling 
educ_dad Mother’s years of schooling 
self_empl_f Father self-employed 
self_emp_m Mother self-employed 
 Household Characteristics 
chl##_## Number of children (in different age ranges, apart from the individual) 
HH_sex Sex of the household head 
HH_empl Employment status of the household head 
index_hh Assets index of the household (as a proxy for permanent income) 
HHsize Household size 
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Variable Definition 
distance_psch Distance to primary school 
receiver Remittance receiver status 
 Community Characteristics 
Index_sch Index of school resource index 
 Regional Characteristics 
Location Rural area categorical variable 
i.oblast Regional categorical variables 
 
As explained before, the remittance receiver status of a household is not likely to be independent 
of the household characteristics. And most likely, many of the same household characteristics 
that affect the receiver status also affect whether or not a child attend school, and unfortunately, 
is almost for sure that it is not possible to observe every characteristic affecting both outcomes. 
In order to deal with this endogeneity problem, two simultaneous Probit equations are estimated. 
The first equation models the probability of a child to be enrolled at school as a function of the 
previously listed variables, including the remittance-receiving status of the household. The second 
models the probability of the household to receive remittances as a function of the same 
variables listed before, plus the proportion of the households in the community that receive 
remittances.  
The marginal effects resulting from the estimation procedure are presented below in Table 21, 
columns (3) onwards. Columns (1) and (2) shows the IV-2SLS results as reference.  The sample 
consisted of 6,641 children in school age (between 7 and 15 years old). The coefficients in the 
Table can be interpreted as the effect of a marginal change in the explanatory variable on the 
probability of a child to be enrolled in school, while keeping the rest of the variables at their 
mean values. Additional regressions by age groups are presented in Appendix 3 
The first set of variables incorporates the children characteristics. As can be observed, age has a 
nonlinear significant effect for all children in school age (Column 3), as well as for boys and girls 
separately (Columns 4 and 5). This probably reflects the fact that parents tend not to enroll their 
children as soon as they turn seven years old, but rather wait until they consider the child old 
enough, as explained in the section 7. On the other hand, the negative sign for older ages is 
consistent with children experiencing an increasing opportunity cost and tend to drop out of 
school, and a shorter time to collect the benefits of education. The direct cost of attending school 
is also higher for lower secondary (basic) school since those are not as available as primary 
schools, especially in the rural areas. 
Interestingly, the sign of the coefficients for the age variable are the contrary of those found by 
Nakamuro (2010) for Tajikistan in 2003. Nevertheless, the signs of Nakamuro contradict the 
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marked pattern of school enrollment by age observed in the unrestricted data in section 7. One 
possible source of different is the sample considered. Nakamuro prefers a smaller sample from 7 
to 22 years old, whereas this paper prefers a larger sample from 7 to 24 years old. However, 
restricting the sample to match that of Nakamuro makes no difference in the sign or significance 
of the coefficients presented in table 21 below37.  
Another difference with Nakamuro comes with the effect of the sex of the children: he found a 
no significant effect. In the present estimation girls have a significant lower probability to be 
enrolled at school: Around 10% fewer probabilities to be enrolled when compared with boys 
with the same age and coming from similar backgrounds. This again is in line with the 
observation of the raw data, in which girls have a 14 percentage points lower enrollment rate.  
The labor market outcomes offer an explanation for this phenomenon. Women have a much 
lower participation in the workforce than men (28.3% against 54.4%), and even those who work 
have considerably lower average earnings than those of males with similar education, age, and 
experience. As previously mention, a gross average of monthly earnings by sex shows that 
females have an average wage of 167.4 Somoni while males earned an average of 411.0 Somoni. 
A simple wage regression also shows that for females with the same education and age (as a 
proxy of experience) than males, would earn approximately half of the wages of the males 
Mother’s education has, in general, a positive effect on the enrollment probabilities, especially if 
the mother has higher education. Noticeable, however, it seems that mother’s education tend to 
favor more to girls.  For every educational level completed by the mother, the probabilities of 
girls attending school increase in a significant way. Nevertheless, only higher education for the 
mother exerts a positive and significant effect on the enrollment of boys. 
The education of the father has a non-significant effect on the school enrollment probabilities for 
the general sample. Nonetheless, when the sample is divided by sex of the children, the father 
education has a significant and positive effect on the education of girls, but a negative effect on 
the education of boys (although only statistically significant for parents with basic education).  
If the parents are self-employed seems to have no significant effect on school enrollment. The 
employment status of the household has a non-significant effect, except for the Girls’ sample.  
                                                     
37 See Appendix 3.3 
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The household head sex has a significant effect. Interestingly, this effect comes mainly from the 
sample of boys. If the household head is a woman, this will increase the probabilities of a boy to 
be enrolled at school up to 4%   
The number of other children in the household in school age has no significant effect for the age 
group from 7 to 10 years old, but it has a positive and significant effect in the group from 11 to 
15 years old. This is contrary to the expectation that more children in the same age group 
decrease the probabilities of an individual child to attend school. A possible explanation, 
although not properly tested, is the existence of economies of scale in sending children to school. 
Sending just one child might be costly to the household, but once the first child is enrolled, the 
extra cost of sending the following ones is decreasing, perhaps due to shared cost such as school 
materials or transportation.  
The wealth of the household, as captured by the asset index, has a positive and significant effect, 
which is expected. Households with higher wealth are capable to keep their children enrolled at 
the school, even when facing a negative income shock since they can resort to their wealth to 
smooth this and other expenditures. On the other hand, the size of the household has a negative 
and significant effect, probably reflecting the difficulty that larger households have to allocate 
scarce resources among their numerous needs. The distance from the household to the nearest 
primary school has a small, but statistically significant effect, which is consistent with the 
hypothesis that higher costs to attend to school diminish the probability of a child to be enrolled. 
The quality of the school facilities has only a small positive effect for girls.  
Finally, remittances have a significant positive effect on school enrollment for the whole sample. 
However, this effect comes mainly due to a strong positive effect of remittances on the girl’s 
school enrollment. A girl living in a household that receives remittances has around 10% higher 
chances to attend school than another girl with similar characteristics and living in a similar 
household and community. 
To understand the different results for boys and girls is useful to compare them with the base 
case scenario in which both are taken together. As the coefficient for the sex indicates, keeping 
everything else equal,   girls have a lower probability to be enrolled at the school. Or put it the 
other way, under equal circumstances, boys have more probabilities to attend school. What is 
more, since boys are more likely to be enrolled, it makes little difference for them if the 
household receive or not remittances (as depicted by the lack of significance of the coefficient of 
remittances in column 5). On the other hand, since girls have lower probabilities to be enrolled, 
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the extra resources coming from remittances do have a positive effect on their probabilities to be 
enrolled.   
Table 21 - Marginal effects over probability of school enrollment 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES IV First Stage IV Biprobit All Biprobit Girls Biprobit Boys 
      
Child characteristics 
age -0.0189 0.551*** 0.370*** 0.403*** 0.340*** 
 (0.0136) (0.0227) (0.0158) (0.0234) (0.0216) 
agesq 0.000742 -0.0230*** -0.0157*** -0.0172*** -0.0144*** 
 (0.000619) (0.000971) (0.000710) (0.00107) (0.000964) 
sex 0.00490 -0.0320*** -0.0390***   
 (0.00972) (0.00886) (0.00889)   
Mother educational level 
Primary 0.0696 0.0982 0.0942 0.160 0.0727 
 (0.0734) (0.113) (0.0871) (0.115) (0.0742) 
Basic -0.0270 0.123 0.114 0.202* 0.0701 
 (0.0550) (0.111) (0.0843) (0.108) (0.0718) 
Secondary -0.0356 0.162 0.150* 0.256** 0.0910 
 (0.0548) (0.111) (0.0849) (0.109) (0.0725) 
Higher -0.0443 0.170 0.166* 0.257** 0.118 
 (0.0630) (0.112) (0.0864) (0.112) (0.0753) 
Father educational level 
Primary -0.161** 0.0399 0.0423 0.133* -0.0368 
 (0.0813) (0.0528) (0.0476) (0.0799) (0.0418) 
Basic -0.101 0.0322 0.0289 0.142* -0.0735*** 
 (0.0804) (0.0412) (0.0380) (0.0730) (0.0269) 
Secondary -0.130* 0.0475 0.0463 0.116 -0.0217 
 (0.0722) (0.0423) (0.0391) (0.0731) (0.0285) 
Higher -0.143* 0.0540 0.0555 0.142* -0.0330 
 (0.0738) (0.0426) (0.0399) (0.0747) (0.0307) 
Self employment      
Mother self-
employee 
-0.00537 0.00549 0.00660 0.0115 0.00244 
 (0.0257) (0.00963) (0.00978) (0.0148) (0.0131) 
Father self-employee -0.0225 0.00568 0.00600 -0.00263 0.00839 
 (0.0199) (0.00985) (0.00980) (0.0163) (0.0117) 
Household head characteristics 
HH_EMPL 0.00994 0.0148 0.0110 0.00259 0.0221* 
 (0.0217) (0.0106) (0.00957) (0.0151) (0.0121) 
HH_sex 0.151*** 0.000397 0.00259 -0.0241 0.0464** 
 (0.0294) (0.0139) (0.0120) (0.0194) (0.0192) 
Other children in the household by age group 
7 to 10 0.00150 -0.00633 -0.00392 -0.00535 0.00333 
 (0.0123) (0.00574) (0.00556) (0.00917) (0.00688) 
11 to 15 -0.0134 0.0299*** 0.0205*** 0.0282*** 0.0150*** 
 (0.0110) (0.00664) (0.00550) (0.00909) (0.00567) 
Other household characteristics 
index_ha 0.0103** 0.00666** 0.00842*** 0.00626 0.0123*** 
 (0.00434) (0.00266) (0.00275) (0.00405) (0.00350) 
HHsize -0.000293 -0.00742*** -0.00617*** -0.00882*** -0.00378* 
 (0.00323) (0.00217) (0.00176) (0.00316) (0.00192) 
distance_psch -0.000108 -0.000950* -0.000911** -0.00169*** -5.13e-05 
 (0.000550) (0.000503) (0.000354) (0.000567) (0.000420) 
Comunity and regional variables  
index_sch 0.00198 0.001000 3.89e-05 -0.00300 0.00522* 
 (0.00441) (0.00237) (0.00227) (0.00324) (0.00266) 
DRS -0.0182 0.0451* 0.0601** 0.102*** 0.0159 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES IV First Stage IV Biprobit All Biprobit Girls Biprobit Boys 
 (0.0330) (0.0230) (0.0255) (0.0372) (0.0277) 
Sughd 0.00708 0.0448** 0.0582** 0.0831** 0.0339 
 (0.0353) (0.0190) (0.0235) (0.0351) (0.0259) 
Kathlon 0.0413 0.0255 0.0392* 0.0698** 0.0156 
 (0.0339) (0.0195) (0.0233) (0.0351) (0.0269) 
GBAO 0.150*** 0.0303 0.0549** 0.0887** 0.0424 
 (0.0439) (0.0237) (0.0266) (0.0390) (0.0305) 
location 0.0258 0.0257 0.0286 0.0325 0.0212 
 (0.0262) (0.0241) (0.0194) (0.0254) (0.0192) 
Remittance receiver status of the household 
receiver   0.0602** 0.0997** -0.0975 
   (0.0266) (0.0434) (0.0671) 
Migr_hh2 
(Instrument) 
0.452***    -0.0975 
 (0.0638)     
Constant 0.264** -2.453***    
 (0.107) (0.165)    
Sub pop 
observations 
6641 6641 6641 3439 3202 
*** Significant at 1%, **Significant at 5%, *Significant at 10% 
Standard errors reported in parenthesis  
 
Table 22 below presents the associated change in the probabilities to be enrolled at a school that 
children experience by living in a household receiving remittance, divided by age group and sex. 
As can be appreciated, girls aged seven to eleven years old have the larger increase: almost 18% 
more probabilities to be enrolled at school than another girl with similar characteristics but living 
in a household not receiving remittances.  
Table 22 - Remittances coefficient by sex and age group 
 7-11 12-15 
 Girls Boys Girls Boys 
Remittance 0.178** -0.0785 0.0815 0.0332 
 (0.0779) (0.0922) (0.0685) (0.0314) 
Source: TLSMS 2007  
How does this compare with the results of the previous literature? The general results differ from 
those presented by Nakamuro (2010) mainly in the statistical significance for boys. However, as 
explained before in the literature review section, there are several methodological reasons to 
doubt about his estimates. What is more, while comparing the coefficients for sex and age, his 
results are contradictory with the large patterns in the data, and no explanation was given by the 
author. Certainly, his data set and the year of collection is different from the one used in this 
paper. Nevertheless, the methodology of collection and the relevant sections of the questionnaire 
are similar, and the representativeness is supposed to be equal. Thus, it seems that the major 
source of discrepancy is the methodological part.  
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Finally, is useful to remember the wherein the consumption distribution households receiving 
remittances are located. The results of the model show that wealth is positively related to 
enrollment. Thus the families with fewer resources, those in the bottom quintiles have fewer 
opportunities to send their children to school. But those households are not the households that 
receive the higher proportion of remittances. Instead, households in the upper quintiles receive a 
larger portion, but they already have more resources to send their children to school. Thus, as in 
the case of poverty and inequality, if in the future more remittances flow to the lower quintiles of 
the income distribution. The effect on education could be larger. 
In summary, the evidence shows that boys are in a better position than girls in Tajikistan when it 
comes to school attendance. Nevertheless, the educational level of the mother, although increases 
the chances of enrollment for both boys and girls, it has a larger effect on the enrollment of girls. 
Likewise, remittances have a larger positive effect on girls. Since children in wealthier households 
have larger chances to be enrolled at school, and a larger proportion of this households receive 
remittances, the overall effect of remittances is likely to be lower than in a scenario in which  a 
larger proportion of households in the lower quintiles of the expenditure distribution receive 
remittances.  
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9. CONCLUSIONS 
 
At the household level, remittances constitute an income transfer likely to increase consumption 
levels, serve as a form to spread risk and deal with market imperfections (such as the capital 
market). Thus, in general terms, they are expected to increase the welfare of the family, not only 
by increasing consumption, but also by allowing them to face negative shocks in the local 
economy and sort the lack of financial means to invest in human or physical capital.  At the 
aggregate level, the effect of remittances on poverty and inequality depends to a large extent of 
where the households receiving remittances are located in the income or expenditure distribution. 
If a larger portion of households receiving remittances is located in the upper part of the 
distribution, the effects of poverty would be small, and inequality will increase. On the other 
hand, if a larger portion of recipients is located in the lower part of the distribution poverty and 
inequality will decrease.  
All in all, remittances in Tajikistan are found to be associated with the reduction in poverty 
incidence, as well as the reduction of the poverty gap. The reduction in poverty incidence, 
however, seems to be relatively small when compared with previous estimations of Betti & 
Lundgren (2012). Two main reasons explain this. First, methodological aspects, such as the 
oversampling of household receiving remittances, are likely to inflate Betti & Lundgren 
estimations, and second, consumption is less volatile than income, and thus poverty measures 
based on income (such as those presented by Betti & Lundgren)  are also more volatile than 
those based on consumption.  
More interesting than methodological differences is the empirical relationship between 
consumption distribution and poverty reduction.  Since as much as 34% of the households in the 
fourth and fifth quintile receive remittances and the no-remittances scenario move the majority 
of them to the fourth or third quintile, poverty does not increase much.   This is precisely what is 
expected from theory, a more or less equal location of households receiving remittances along 
the consumption distribution or a slightly higher proportion of the upper part, should have little 
effect on poverty. 
A word is deserved to the limitations of the study. The methodology used in this paper is 
designed to construct consistent contrafactual consumption for the individual household, in 
which what varies is no more than remittances and returnee migrants, so the difference between 
the actual consumption and the contrafactual can be assigned to those changes. These individual 
results are then aggregated to infer the effect of poverty (and inequality). Nevertheless,   in this 
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process general equilibrium effects are not incorporated. For instance, if higher food demand 
coming from household receiving remittances increases the earnings of local farmers is, 
unfortunately, not capture by the method. Therefore, the poverty reduction found should be 
treated as evidence of the effect of remittances on poverty and thought as a lower bound, rather 
than definitive figure. Identifying such general effects in the economic activity of specific 
geographical areas as well as for the aggregate economy of Tajikistan is an exciting field for 
further research.   
Regarding inequality, in general, terms, remittances are associated with an increase in 
consumption inequality in Tajikistan. As with poverty, an explanation to this is the fact that a 
higher proportion of households receiving remittances is found in the middle and higher part of 
the expenditure distribution. Since households already in better economic positions receive most 
of the remittances, inequality increases.  
Remittances are found to have a positive effect on school enrollment, especially for girls.  The 
evidence from the TLSMS 2007 shows that boys are in general in a better position than girls in 
Tajikistan when it comes to school attendance. However, when a girl lives in a similar household 
than a boy, and both households receive remittances, the girl will experience a higher increase in 
her chances to attend to school. A possible explanation for this is that boys would attend to 
school regardless or not the household receives remittances, whereas the extra resources coming 
from remittances do matter for girls.  
Similarly to poverty and inequality, the effect of remittances on school enrollment is related to 
the expenditure distribution. Since children in wealthier households have larger chances to be 
enrolled at school, and a larger proportion of this households receive remittances, the overall 
effect of remittances is likely to be lower than in a scenario in which  a larger proportion of 
households in the lower quintiles of the expenditure distribution receive remittances. 
It remains to further research how the effect of remittances on poverty, inequality and school 
enrollment changes over time. As argued before, thicker migratory networks are likely to decrease 
the cost of migration, allowing more less wealthy households to send migrants abroad and receive 
remittances.  If this is indeed the case, poverty in Tajikistan will further decrease, inequality could 
diminish, and school enrollment could increase even more. For now, however, the evidence 
points out to a mild effect of remittances on poverty reduction, a positive effects on girls 
enrollment at school, but also to an increase in inequality.   
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Appendix  
 
Appendix 1 -Variables Included in the Household Asset Index 
- Construction material of the walls of the dwelling 
- Construction material of the roof of the dwelling 
- Construction material of the floor of the dwelling 
- Number of rooms of the dwelling 
- Kitchen as a separate room in the dwelling 
- Central heating system available in the dwelling 
- Use of biomass fuels for heating 
- Use of Gas for different proposes in the dwelling 
- Mainline Telephone available in the dwelling 
- Cellphone owned by a member of the household 
- Plumped water available in the dwelling 
- Flush toilet available in the dwelling 
- Pit latrine available in the dwelling 
- No latrine available in the dwelling 
- Land extension owned by the household 
- Ownership of: gas oven, electric oven, gas hobb, electric stove, electric water heater, 
outdoor metal stove, kerosene stove, wood stove, earthen stove, sandalee, generator, 
radiator electric, refrigerator, freezer, washing machine, electric iron, vacuum cleaner, air 
conditioner, electric fan, electric room heater, electric lamp, kerosene lamp, electric water 
boiler, gas water boiler, microwave oven, electrical sewing machine, color television, TV 
black & white, radio, stereo, video player, computer, satellite dish, tape/cd player, video 
camera, motorcycle/scooter, car, truck, bicycle.  
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Appendix 2 - Poverty with the alternative poverty line 
Index Actual Measure No remittances scenario Difference 
Headcount Ratio 
0.1973*** 
(0.0072) 
0.1912*** 
(0.0073) 
0.0061** 
(0.0031) 
Poverty Gap Index 
(FGT 1.0) 
0.0399*** 
(0.0020) 
0.0371*** 
(0.0019) 
0.0028*** 
(0.0006) 
Poverty Severity Index (FGT 2.0) 
0.0122*** 
(0.0008) 
0.0112*** 
(0.0008) 
0.0010*** 
(0.0002) 
Data source: TLSMSM 2007 
Notes: Bootstrapped standard errors reported in parenthesis.  
*** Significant at 1%, **Significant at 5%, *Significant at 10% 
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Appendix  3 – Biprobit Model for sex and Age Group 
Appendix 3.1 - Marginal effects over probability of school enrollment - Girls 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Girls Girls Aged 7 - 10 Girls Aged 11 - 15 
    
Child characteristics    
age 0.403*** 1.824*** 0.171 
 (0.0234) (0.173) (0.109) 
agesq -0.0172*** -0.100*** -0.00726* 
 (0.00107) (0.0104) (0.00413) 
Mother educational level   
Primary 0.160 0.144 0.164 
 (0.115) (0.120) (0.123) 
Basic 0.202* 0.158 0.209* 
 (0.108) (0.101) (0.114) 
Secondary 0.256** 0.218** 0.270** 
 (0.109) (0.103) (0.113) 
Higher 0.257** 0.209* 0.287** 
 (0.112) (0.117) (0.115) 
Father educational level   
Primary 0.133* 0.104 0.213* 
 (0.0799) (0.0881) (0.128) 
Basic 0.142* 0.183*** 0.191 
 (0.0730) (0.0611) (0.126) 
Secondary 0.116 0.0861 0.201 
 (0.0731) (0.0584) (0.125) 
Higher 0.142* 0.120** 0.217* 
 (0.0747) (0.0591) (0.127) 
Self-employment    
Mother self-employee 0.0115 -0.0235 0.0321 
 (0.0148) (0.0228) (0.0209) 
Father self-employee -0.00263 0.00859 -0.00950 
 (0.0163) (0.0220) (0.0203) 
Household head characteristics   
HH_EMPL 0.00259 0.00698 -0.00420 
 (0.0151) (0.0207) (0.0178) 
HH_sex -0.0241 -0.0145 -0.0228 
 (0.0194) (0.0349) (0.0258) 
Other children in the household by age group  
7 to 10 -0.00535 0.00192 -0.00273 
 (0.00917) (0.0128) (0.0102) 
11 to 15 0.0282*** 0.0239** 0.0211 
 (0.00909) (0.0116) (0.0128) 
Other household characteristics   
index_ha 0.00626 0.000462 0.00744 
 (0.00405) (0.00638) (0.00464) 
HHsize -0.00882*** -0.0117*** -0.00555 
 (0.00316) (0.00350) (0.00389) 
distance_psch -0.00169*** -0.000781 -0.00162*** 
 (0.000567) (0.000854) (0.000497) 
index_sch -0.00300 0.00406 -0.00798** 
 (0.00324) (0.00460) (0.00401) 
Comunity and regional variables   
DRS 0.102*** 0.0426 0.127** 
 (0.0372) (0.0432) (0.0551) 
Sughd 0.0831** 0.0282 0.113** 
 (0.0351) (0.0470) (0.0531) 
Kathlon 0.0698** 0.00584 0.0942* 
 (0.0351) (0.0440) (0.0524) 
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 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Girls Girls Aged 7 - 10 Girls Aged 11 - 15 
GBAO 0.0887** -0.00923 0.162*** 
 (0.0390) (0.0531) (0.0556) 
location 0.0325 -0.0136 0.0610** 
 (0.0254) (0.0323) (0.0263) 
Remittances receiver status of the household  
receiver 0.0997** 0.178** 0.0815 
 (0.0434) (0.0779) (0.0685) 
    
Observations 3,202 1,382 1,820 
*** Significant at 1%, **Significant at 5%, *Significant at 10% 
Standard errors reported in parenthesis  
 
Appendix 3.2 - Marginal effects over probability of school enrollment - Boys 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Boys Boys Aged 7 - 10 Boys Aged 11 - 15 
    
Child characteristics    
age 0.340*** 1.406*** -0.121* 
 (0.0216) (0.129) (0.0640) 
agesq -0.0144*** -0.0757*** 0.00447* 
 (0.000964) (0.00770) (0.00243) 
Mother educational level   
Primary 0.0727 0.0421 0.0918 
 (0.0742) (0.0640) (0.0578) 
Basic 0.0701 0.101** 0.0510 
 (0.0718) (0.0507) (0.0571) 
Secondary 0.0910 0.103* 0.0627 
 (0.0725) (0.0538) (0.0572) 
Higher 0.118 0.120 0.0918 
 (0.0753) (0.0727) (0.0578) 
Father educational level    
Primary -0.0368 -0.0208 -0.0139 
 (0.0418) (0.0709) (0.0334) 
Basic -0.0735*** -0.0901 -0.0407** 
 (0.0269) (0.0595) (0.0177) 
Secondary -0.0217 -0.0404 -0.00479 
 (0.0285) (0.0573) (0.00987) 
Higher -0.0330 -0.0634 0.00296 
 (0.0307) (0.0583) (0.0144) 
Self-employment    
Mother self-employee 0.00244 -0.0128 0.00211 
 (0.0131) (0.0195) (0.0113) 
Father self-employee 0.00839 -0.0133 0.0190* 
 (0.0117) (0.0175) (0.0108) 
Household head characteristics   
HH_EMPL 0.0221* 0.0463*** 0.00283 
 (0.0121) (0.0174) (0.0108) 
HH_sex 0.0464** 0.0393* 0.0111 
 (0.0192) (0.0238) (0.0174) 
Other children in the household by age group  
7 to 10 0.00333 0.0187* -0.000153 
 (0.00688) (0.0106) (0.00458) 
11 to 15 0.0150*** 0.00674 0.00809 
 (0.00567) (0.00873) (0.00606) 
Other household characteristics   
index_ha 0.0123*** 0.0133** 0.00717** 
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 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Boys Boys Aged 7 - 10 Boys Aged 11 - 15 
 (0.00350) (0.00583) (0.00304) 
HHsize -0.00378* -0.00524* 0.000596 
 (0.00192) (0.00277) (0.00206) 
distance_psch -5.13e-05 -0.000500 0.000106 
 (0.000420) (0.000489) (0.000553) 
index_sch 0.00522* 0.00769* 0.00104 
 (0.00266) (0.00438) (0.00215) 
Comunity and regional variables   
DRS 0.0159 0.0602 -0.00936 
 (0.0277) (0.0369) (0.0260) 
Sughd 0.0339 0.0343 0.0171 
 (0.0259) (0.0372) (0.0227) 
Kathlon 0.0156 0.0104 0.00652 
 (0.0269) (0.0385) (0.0245) 
GBAO 0.0424 0.0300 0.0305 
 (0.0305) (0.0448) (0.0236) 
location 0.0212 0.000177 0.0231 
 (0.0192) (0.0281) (0.0171) 
Remittances receiver status of the household  
receiver -0.0975 -0.0785 0.0332 
 (0.0671) (0.0922) (0.0314) 
    
Observations 3,439 1,510 1,929 
*** Significant at 1%, **Significant at 5%, *Significant at 10% 
Standard errors reported in parenthesis  
 
Appendix 3.3 - Marginal effects over probability of school enrollment – Ages 6 to 22 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES All Boys Girls 
    
Child characteristics    
age 0.231*** 0.226*** 0.236*** 
 (0.00710) (0.00832) (0.00983) 
agesq -0.00935*** -0.00890*** -0.00985*** 
 (0.000250) (0.000294) (0.000360) 
sex -0.102***   
 (0.00837)   
Mother educational level    
Primary 0.0768 0.135** 0.00210 
 (0.0595) (0.0649) (0.0714) 
Basic 0.0597 0.0887 0.0477 
 (0.0556) (0.0572) (0.0674) 
Secondary 0.0973* 0.111* 0.104 
 (0.0548) (0.0572) (0.0671) 
Higher 0.173*** 0.195*** 0.172** 
 (0.0578) (0.0602) (0.0733) 
Father educational level    
Primary 0.0612 -0.00250 0.139** 
 (0.0433) (0.0513) (0.0669) 
Basic 0.00252 -0.0669* 0.0708 
 (0.0344) (0.0389) (0.0561) 
Secondary 0.0317 -0.00255 0.0654 
 (0.0328) (0.0333) (0.0574) 
Higher 0.0983*** 0.0742** 0.118* 
 (0.0345) (0.0346) (0.0615) 
Self-employment    
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 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES All Boys Girls 
Mother self-employee 0.00968 0.00534 0.0177 
 (0.0108) (0.0137) (0.0156) 
Father self-employee 0.00767 0.0172 -0.00672 
 (0.00991) (0.0121) (0.0164) 
Household head characteristics   
HH_EMPL 0.0165 0.0104 0.0203 
 (0.0105) (0.0131) (0.0149) 
HH_sex 0.00364 0.0151 -0.0234 
 (0.0223) (0.0157) (0.0258) 
Other children in the household by age group   
7 to 10 0.00544 0.0104 0.00111 
 (0.00542) (0.00708) (0.00728) 
11 to 15 -0.00331 -0.00614 0.00273 
 (0.00567) (0.00659) (0.00855) 
Other household characteristics   
index_ha 0.0135*** 0.0128*** 0.0136*** 
 (0.00309) (0.00403) (0.00354) 
HHsize -0.00635*** -0.00601*** -0.00546* 
 (0.00193) (0.00222) (0.00299) 
distance_psch -0.000541** 9.65e-05 -0.00119** 
 (0.000264) (0.000414) (0.000500) 
index_sch 0.000901 0.00323 -0.00150 
 (0.00354) (0.00327) (0.00440) 
Comunity and regional 
variables 
   
DRS 0.00770 -0.0696*** 0.0818*** 
 (0.0217) (0.0262) (0.0300) 
Sughd 0.0327* -0.00892 0.0673** 
 (0.0193) (0.0253) (0.0285) 
Kathlon 0.0167 -0.0276 0.0467 
 (0.0226) (0.0273) (0.0310) 
GBAO 0.0868*** -0.00271 0.168*** 
 (0.0278) (0.0297) (0.0347) 
location 0.0178 0.0233 0.00502 
 (0.0179) (0.0186) (0.0228) 
Remittances receiver status of the household   
receiver 0.0312 -0.0722 0.219** 
 (0.128) (0.0628) (0.0949) 
    
Observations 11,642 5,789 5,853 
*** Significant at 1%, **Significant at 5%, *Significant at 10% 
Standard errors reported in parenthesis  
 
 
